CHICAGO (LN) — The Seventh Circuit on Monday vacated summary judgment for the City of Markham on Vairrun Strickland’s Title VII claims, ruling that an unreviewed state administrative decision cannot preclude those federal discrimination claims under the Supreme Court’s decision in University of Tennessee v. Elliott. The panel affirmed dismissal of Strickland’s § 1983 and state-law claims, which remain barred under Illinois preclusion principles.

Strickland, who worked as a firefighter for the City of Markham for over a decade, was terminated in April 2021 by the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners after hearings on administrative charges. The Board found that Strickland had lied to detectives during an arson investigation and had put department employees at risk by coming to work while infected with COVID-19.

After the Board issued an amended decision in April 2022, Strickland voluntarily dismissed his state-court lawsuit challenging the Board’s decision. He had already filed this federal suit in March 2022 alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII, denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and violations of the Illinois State Officials and Employees Ethics Act.

The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims, concluding that Illinois claim preclusion principles barred the federal action based on the Board’s decision.

The Seventh Circuit disagreed on the Title VII claims. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts must give full faith and credit to state court judgments, but the Supreme Court in Elliott held that § 1738 extends only to state court judgments, not unreviewed state administrative proceedings. “Congress did not intend unreviewed state administrative proceedings to have preclusive effect on Title VII claims,” the court said, quoting Elliott, 478 U.S. at 794.

The panel found the district court erred by concluding that the Board’s decision, standing alone, could preclude Strickland’s Title VII claim regardless of the subsequent dismissal.

The court also rejected the defendants’ argument that Strickland’s voluntary dismissal of his state-court suit had preclusive effect. Under Illinois law, voluntary dismissals are not treated as final judgments on the merits where there are no claim-splitting concerns, and the district court found no such concerns here.

However, the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of Strickland’s § 1983 and state-law claims. Under Elliott, federal common law permits unreviewed state administrative proceedings to preclude claims under § 1983 if the state agency was acting in a judicial capacity. The court agreed with the district court that Strickland had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his civil rights claims as defenses in the Board proceeding, and that he could have joined those claims with a request for judicial review of the administrative decision.

Strickland argued that the Board had no jurisdiction over civil rights claims, but the panel noted that the same was true of the Civil Service Commission in Welch v. Johnson, 907 F.2d 714, which the Seventh Circuit found controlling.

The panel comprised Judges Hamilton, St. Eve, and Kirsch. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the Title VII claims.