Ohio Supreme Court Says Courts Retain Jurisdiction After Reinstating Dismissed Cases

The per curiam opinion was joined by all seven justices.

Relators, Javitch Block, L.L.C. and attorney Annemarie Wodzisz, who represent UHG I, L.L.C. in a debt-collection action against Angel Miller, sought writs of prohibition, mandamus, and procedendo to halt a case known as Miller II pending before a Fayette County common pleas judge. They argued that Judge Susan Wollscheid of the Washington Court House Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate and certify the case to the court of common pleas after she had sua sponte dismissed it in October 2024.

The court rejected that argument. Once Judge Wollscheid reinstated the case after Miller filed a motion under R.C. 2701.20(B) requesting the clerk to docket her answer and counterclaims, the municipal court had jurisdiction to proceed, the court held.

The court explained that once a court properly reinstates a case, the court generally has jurisdiction to proceed in the case, citing State ex rel. Gideon v. Page, 2024-Ohio-4867.

The court also rejected relators’ invocation of the jurisdictional-priority rule, which generally bars a second court from exercising jurisdiction over claims already pending before another court of concurrent jurisdiction. Relators argued that because Miller I—a related debt-collection case involving the same parties—was already pending in the court of common pleas when Miller II was filed, the municipal court never had jurisdiction over Miller II.

The court found the rule inapplicable. Because the municipal court has certified the claims and counterclaims in both Miller I and Miller II to the court of common pleas, the same court will address all claims, eliminating the risk of conflicting rulings the rule is designed to prevent, the opinion states.

The court further noted that relators themselves brought Miller II and cannot use the jurisdictional-priority rule to shield themselves from Miller’s counterclaims, which include allegations of violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Relators also argued they lack an adequate remedy at law because they cannot immediately appeal certain jurisdictional rulings. The court said they will be able to challenge the common pleas court’s eventual judgment on appeal.

The opinion notes that relators’ motion to certify the record—which asked the court to order clerks to certify records from Miller I and Miller II—was denied because the rules governing original actions do not contain a provision analogous to the certification rules that apply to appeals.

Writs denied.