The underlying dispute pits plaintiff Charles Young against defendants Rob Kolkman, Constable Kolkman, LLC, and Michael Erickson, Utah constables who allegedly collected a debt from Young in ways that exceeded the scope of a Writ of Execution. Young also brings a fraud claim under Utah law. The central legal question is whether constables acting as state officers are shielded from FDCPA liability under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(C). District Judge Ted Stewart held at summary judgment that the exemption does not apply because the defendants went beyond what the writ authorized — including, among other things, setting up a payment plan — and he declined to disturb that holding on reconsideration. (The court denied both sides' summary judgment motions; the underlying FDCPA violations remain to be decided at trial.)
The Kolkman defendants filed their motion late on April 16, 2026, with the court receiving both motions on April 17, 2026, the business day before trial was set to begin April 20. Judge Stewart called the timing "shamelessly untimely," noting that most of the arguments had been available since the summary judgment order issued more than a year earlier, on March 26, 2025, and that defendants offered no excuse for the delay.
On the merits, defendants argued the court had applied an unduly narrow reading of the state-officer exemption, had ignored undisputed evidence that they were acting within their official duties, and had failed to account for intervening legislation. Judge Stewart rejected all three grounds. He noted that defendants cited Sexton v. Poulsen & Skousen, P.C., 372 F. Supp. 3d 1307 (D. Utah 2019), as controlling authority for the exemption, but held that defendants either failed to read or misrepresented the very next paragraph of that decision, which states that a state officer is immune from FDCPA liability only while collecting a debt in the performance of official duties, and that those duties are defined by the orders and writs issued by a court. The Sexton court itself held the exemption unavailable where a constable exceeded the scope of the relevant writ — the same conclusion Judge Stewart reached here.
On the legislative argument, defendants pointed to Utah Senate Bill 156, passed March 10, 2026, and set to take effect May 6, 2026, which amends Utah Code § 17-78-603(7) to allow a constable, with the approval of the directing party, to establish a payment schedule with a debtor in lieu of seizing property. Defendants argued the bill was the legislature's response to district court decisions that misread existing law and that it applied retroactively as a clarifying amendment. Judge Stewart rejected both claims. He reviewed publicly available recordings of the legislature's committee meetings and floor debates and held they did not support defendants' representations. The bill's sponsor described its aim as providing constables with a little bit more flexibility in handling debt collection by allowing them to establish a payment schedule instead of immediately seizing property — language indicating the legislature understood it was adding a new tool, not confirming one that already existed. The court also noted that the bill was first introduced in February 2025 as S.B. 313, before the summary judgment order had even issued, making defendants' claim that the legislature was reacting to this court's ruling implausible on its face. On retroactivity, the court held the amendments are clearly substantive, not clarifying, and that neither the bill's language nor the legislative record contains any indication of retroactive intent.
Judge Stewart held that the combination of the filing's timing and the frivolity of its arguments exhibited apparent bad faith — expressing concern that the motions evinced an improper attempt to harass and distract opposing counsel as he prepared for trial. He ordered defendants' attorneys to appear at 8:00 a.m. on April 20, 2026, before trial begins, to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed under Rule 11 or the court's inherent power to sanction abusive conduct.