LYNCHBURG, Va. (LN) — U.S. District Judge Norman Moon denied summary judgment to Lynchburg Police Detective G.L. Waterman on Monday, ruling that a reasonable jury could find the detective violated a motorist’s Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a search that went beyond the scope of a lawful Terry stop.
Khalil Braxton sued Waterman under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Virginia state law, alleging the detective violated his constitutional rights during a September 2020 traffic stop by conducting an excessive search and assaulting him.
Body-worn camera footage shows Waterman pulling over a red Dodge Magnum for dark window tint. After running the driver’s name, Ayeque Page, through his device, Waterman told another officer, “I think he was on the run for some time, as a matter of fact, I wanna say he was a suspect maybe in a shooting or a robbery.”
The device identified Page as a “criminal gang member.”
When Officer Seth Reed’s K9 unit alerted to the odor of narcotics, Waterman and Reed placed the occupants in handcuffs and began searching the vehicle. Waterman found an “eight ball of coke,” a digital scale, and a plastic spice container with what appeared to be “homemade pills.”
Waterman then turned his attention to Braxton, the passenger seat.
Moon wrote that while Waterman had reasonable suspicion to perform a Terry frisk, the scope of the search exceeded what was permitted. Waterman emptied Braxton’s pockets without first patting him down and then searched the area between Braxton’s legs.
Braxton protested, telling Waterman, “you don’t need to grab my fuckin’ balls bro.”
Waterman pulled Braxton back and said, “I can feel something.” Braxton replied, “can I tell you what it is? It’s my scrotum. That is my scrotum.”
The officer assisting Waterman said, “that is where people hide coke. We’re not saying you have any, but we can’t confirm or deny that until we’re finished, okay?”
Moon ruled that a jury could find the search was evidentiary rather than for officer safety, noting the assisting officer’s comment and the fact that Braxton had already been frisked and handcuffed.
“The authority of an officer to perform a Terry frisk is ‘narrowly drawn’ and ‘permit[s] a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer,’ ” Moon wrote, citing Terry v. Ohio. “An officer is not justified in conducting a general exploratory search for evidence under the guise of a stop-and-frisk.”
Moon also rejected Waterman’s argument that Braxton consented to the search. Waterman pointed to a conversation where Braxton said “go ahead” after being told, “I found something. You getting searched.”
Moon found Braxton’s statements inconsistent and noted the conversation occurred after two searches had already taken place.
Waterman argued the search was analogous to a search incident to arrest, relying on Cupp v. Murphy. Moon distinguished Cupp, noting Braxton was never formally arrested and the search was far more invasive than the limited fingernail search in that case.
Moon granted summary judgment on Braxton’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, which Braxton had abandoned by conceding the Fourth Amendment was the proper vehicle for the claim.
Moon denied summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment and state law claims, leaving them for trial.
Moon also ruled that Waterman waived a statute of limitations defense by failing to specifically plead it in his motion for summary judgment.