NEW ORLEANS (LN) — The Fifth Circuit on Thursday affirmed judgment on the pleadings against an IT systems administrator's Americans with Disabilities Act claims against Army contractor GStek, Inc., holding that the Army's decision to bar full-time telework at Fort Polk meant in-person attendance remained an essential job function and that the COVID pandemic did not alter that analysis.

Albert Hayes began working as a contract systems administrator at Fort Polk's Army Network Enterprise Center in 2021, initially permitted to telework during the pandemic under a prior contractor. When GStek took over the contract, Hayes's employment transferred to GStek but his role remained the same. In February 2022, GStek and the Army transitioned away from telework and required Hayes to return to the office. He was overstimulated and in May 2022 was diagnosed with autism, major depressive disorder, and social anxiety disorder. He was hospitalized for suicidal ideations in August 2022 and filed a telework accommodation request two months later.

GStek's project manager was initially confident Hayes could perform his work remotely, but Army officials determined it "would not be interest of the organization to allow full-time teleworking." The Army retained express authority under the contract to set terms and conditions of GStek employees' work, including whether they could telework. GStek offered a partial compromise — two to three days of remote work per week — from December 2022 through January 2023.

That arrangement collapsed after Hayes had a mental breakdown on January 16, 2023, worked from home through January 19, and told GStek his doctor recommended a medical leave of absence. GStek fired him on January 25, citing absenteeism and other concerns.

Writing for a unanimous panel, Circuit Judge Edith H. Jones held that Hayes failed to establish a prima facie case on any of his three ADA theories. On the failure-to-accommodate claim, the court held Hayes was not a qualified individual because in-person attendance was an essential function of his job — a conclusion supported by the Army's own determination and the structure of GStek's contract with the Army.

The opinion drew a firm line on the pandemic's legal legacy. Quoting a recent Fifth Circuit decision that itself quoted EEOC guidance, Jones wrote that an employer's decision to permit telework during COVID "does not mean that the employer permanently changed a job's essential functions, that telework is always a feasible accommodation, or that it does not pose an undue hardship." The court also noted that Hayes's supervisor had expressed concern that a full-time telework accommodation would prompt a flood of similar employee requests and potentially damage GStek's contractual relationship with the Army.

The partial accommodation GStek did provide — two to three days remote per week — satisfied the ADA, the court held. The fact that Hayes continually demanded a different accommodation did not change that analysis, Jones wrote, because the statute does not require an employer to grant an employee's preferred accommodation.

The discrimination and retaliation claims fell with the failure-to-accommodate theory. On retaliation, Hayes argued that the three-month gap between his accommodation request and his termination showed causation, but the court cited Supreme Court precedent holding that a three-month interval is not sufficiently close to support an inference of retaliation.

Hayes had also sued the Army directly on a joint-employer theory, but the district court dismissed those claims after holding he was not an Army employee and had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. He did not appeal that ruling.

The decision arrives as post-pandemic telework disputes continue to generate ADA litigation across the circuits. The Fifth Circuit's explicit rejection of COVID-era remote work as a baseline for the essential-functions analysis provides employers in the circuit with doctrinal support for resisting permanent telework demands.