Indiana Tort Claims Act Cannot Shield Officer From Wrongful Death Suit Over Fatal Shooting of Domestic Violence Victim, Court Rules

FORT WAYNE, Ind. (LN) — A federal judge in Indiana denied a motion to dismiss a wrongful death claim against a Fort Wayne police officer, ruling that the Indiana Tort Claims Act's immunity provision does not bar the suit where the complaint adequately alleges willful, wanton, and malicious conduct.

Danisha Warren, acting as personal representative of the estate of DaChe'na Warren-Hill, sued the City of Fort Wayne, former Police Chief Steve Reed, Officer Mark A. Guzman, and a man named Cedric Griffin, alleging that on November 19, 2023, Guzman shot into a vehicle in which Warren-Hill was attempting to escape a beating, killing her.

According to the complaint, Warren-Hill did not pose a threat to Guzman or anyone else when she was driving away, Guzman lacked probable cause to believe such a threat existed, and he issued no warning and attempted no less lethal use of force before firing.

Guzman argued the ITCA shielded him from personal liability because he was acting within the scope of his employment when he fired. Chief Judge Holly A. Brady agreed he was — the opinion notes that the use of force, even deadly force, incidental to an arrest is a recognized tool of policing — but held that did not end the analysis.

The ITCA contains two subsections that Indiana courts have long struggled to reconcile. Subsection B bars personal suits against government employees who act within the scope of employment. Subsection C, however, requires that any personal lawsuit allege the employee's act was criminal, clearly outside the scope of employment, malicious, willful and wanton, or calculated to benefit the employee personally.

Brady resolved the tension by relying on a 2020 Indiana Supreme Court decision, Burton v. Brenner, which held that Subsection C also authorizes a lawsuit against an employee personally when a plaintiff alleges the employee's act or omission falls into one of those categories — even if the employee was acting within the scope of employment.

Applying that framework, Brady held that so long as the plaintiff sufficiently pleads that Officer Guzman's actions fell within one or more of the five categories in Subsection C, the wrongful death claim can proceed even though Officer Guzman acted within the scope of his employment.

The complaint's allegation that the shooting was done willfully, wantonly, and maliciously, supported by facts portraying the killing of a domestic violence victim who the complaint alleges posed no threat, was enough to clear the motion-to-dismiss bar, Brady held.

The ruling was not a complete loss for the defense. Warren had conceded that official-capacity claims against Chief Reed were duplicative of those against the city, and Brady dismissed Reed with prejudice.

The wrongful death claim against Guzman now proceeds toward discovery. The Section 1983 excessive force claim against Guzman and the failure-to-train claim against the city, which were not subject to the motion to dismiss, also remain pending, as do claims against Griffin, the man the complaint alleges beat Warren-Hill before Guzman arrived.