The dispute centers on allegations that Polyloom and Challenger monopolized the market for master putting turf, a specific type of artificial putting surface constructed from nylon synthetic fibers tufted into an embossed rubber backing. StarPro and Selton sued for monopolization and attempted monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, alongside state law claims for breach of partnership duties and breach of warranty.
The 11th Circuit’s per curiam opinion, issued by Judges Jordan, Jill Pryor, and Kidd, focused on whether the appellants adequately defined a distinct product market. The court expressed significant doubts that the appellants plausibly alleged there is a product market in master putting turf alone, separate from comparable golf putting turfs. The court noted the lack of allegations regarding reasonable interchangeability or cross-elasticity of demand between master putting turf and other turfs.
Even assuming a distinct market existed, the court held that the complaint negated any plausible inference of monopoly power. The complaint alleged that North Georgia was replete with synthetic turf manufacturers capable of producing the disputed product, and no patents existed to preclude market entry.
The opinion highlighted that a former executive at Challenger had approached Selton about developing master putting turf for a new company, and another unnamed manufacturer had previously produced the product before allegedly ceasing sales to StarPro. These facts undermined the claim that Polyloom and Challenger controlled the market or were close to achieving monopoly power.
The court also affirmed the dismissal of state law claims. It rejected the partnership claim because the complaint failed to allege that the parties agreed to share risks, expenses, or profits, describing the relationship instead as a traditional manufacturer-distributor arrangement.
Finally, the breach of warranty claim failed because StarPro and Selton accepted nonconforming turf without notifying Polyloom or Challenger within a reasonable time. The court noted the appellants waived any argument regarding the timing of notice by failing to provide legal authority or define what constitutes a reasonable time under Georgia law.