HARRISBURG (LN) — The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled May 19 that a school district’s use of a monetary threshold to select properties for tax assessment appeals does not violate the state constitutional Uniformity Clause, provided the policy does not create a prohibited subclass of properties defined by impermissible characteristics such as property type, use, or owner residency status.
The court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s judgment, which had found the Downingtown Area School District’s policy arbitrary. The intermediate court had previously characterized the district's exclusion of a Lowe’s property as being based on the attorney’s demeanor, but the Supreme Court rejected this reasoning. Justice Sallie Mundy, writing for the court, stated the record showed the district was concerned that the “dark-store theory” of valuation would prevail and cost the district money.
Justice Mundy rejected the Commonwealth Court’s requirement that a district must appeal all properties meeting the threshold or none at all. The court held that taxing districts cannot reasonably appeal every property within their borders.
“Taxing districts ‘cannot reasonably appeal every property within their borders,’” Mundy wrote, citing the court’s prior decision in GM Berkshire Hills v. Berks County Board of Assessment Appeals. She noted that the evidence suggested over 100 properties out of the 28,000 situated within the school district met the $10,000 threshold.
“There is nothing arbitrary or discriminatory when a taxing district considers the risks and potential rewards of appealing a specific property, and ultimately decides not to go forward on the grounds that the financial risk to the district is too high,” Mundy wrote.
The court further ruled that the school district did not violate uniformity by adding a subject property to the appeal list after its consultant had already submitted a list of 15 properties. The property, an apartment complex, was added after the district learned of its recent sale for $82 million, which would have yielded $200,000 in additional annual taxes to the school district.
Mundy wrote that the Uniformity Clause prohibits the systemic differential treatment of a subclass of property defined by type or residency status, but it does not prohibit a subclass described simply as “the properties selected by the taxing district for appeal.”
The court also rejected the argument that the policy discriminated against residential properties because none were appealed in tax year 2020. Mundy noted that the policy does not exclude any type of property and that the school district had appealed residential properties in the past. She emphasized that the Uniformity Clause focuses on purposeful differential treatment, not disparate impact.
“The Uniformity Clause focuses on purposeful differential treatment, not differential impact,” Mundy wrote. “A neutral, systematic treatment of all properties might affect different properties differently due to their economic value, which varies as the economy and markets fluctuate.”
The court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
The school district’s policy manual states that the board has the responsibility to equalize the cost of providing a quality education among all property taxpayers. The policy allows the chief financial officer to review recent real estate transactions or work with a third-party firm to identify properties that may be underassessed.
The case was argued on September 11, 2025, and decided on May 19, 2026.