6th Circuit Holds Interior Noncitizens Entitled to Bond Hearings, Narrowing Mandatory Detention Scope

The panel’s opinion, authored by U.S. Circuit Judge Clay, rejected the government’s interpretation that the statute sweeps in all noncitizens present without lawful status. The court held that the term “seeking admission” requires an affirmative act of applying for lawful entry, which the petitioners—who had lived in the U.S. for years without incident—did not perform.

Petitioners in the consolidated appeals, including Juan Manuel Lopez-Campos and Juan Carlos Sanchez Alvarez, are citizens of Mexico, El Salvador, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Guatemala who have resided in the United States without lawful status for years. Many are parents to U.S.-citizen children and have minor traffic offenses but no other significant criminal history.

All petitioners were arrested by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement or Customs and Border Patrol agents and charged with entering without inspection. Pursuant to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, the government detained them under § 1225(b)(2)(A) without determining their flight risk or dangerousness.

Immigration judges mostly denied bond, determining they lacked jurisdiction to grant it under the mandatory detention statute. The district courts for the Eastern and Western Districts of Michigan granted the petitioners’ habeas corpus petitions, finding the detention unlawful and a violation of Fifth Amendment due process rights.

Following the district courts’ orders, the government released every petitioner without holding a bond hearing, except for one petitioner who was released prior to disposition. The government then appealed.

The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by distinguishing between the two statutory detention schemes. Section 1225 governs applicants for admission, while Section 1226 applies to noncitizens already pending removal decisions. The court noted that Congress defined an “applicant for admission” as a noncitizen present in the U.S. who has not been admitted or who arrives in the U.S.

However, the court held that § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention clause applies only to those “seeking admission.” Citing dictionary definitions, the opinion stated that “seeking” implies a present action to try to find or look for lawful entry.

“Noncitizens like Petitioners, who did not attempt lawful entry into the United States and are actively avoiding being inspected for lawful entry, are not ‘seeking admission’ and are thus not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention scheme,” the opinion read.

The court rejected the government’s argument that every “applicant for admission” is necessarily “seeking admission.” It held that Congress’s use of different words implied different meanings, and that reading the government’s view would render the phrase “seeking admission” superfluous.

The panel also pointed to the lack of an “escape hatch” in § 1225(b)(2)(A) for detention capacity, unlike § 1226(c), which Congress knew would strain resources. The court noted that Congress was aware of the millions of noncitizens but did not provide transitional provisions for mandatory detention under § 1225, suggesting it did not intend to apply it to that population.

Additionally, the court cited the government’s 29-year practice of applying § 1226(a) to noncitizens like the petitioners as consequential evidence that the statutory interpretation is natural and reasonable.

On the due process claim, the Sixth Circuit affirmed that the petitioners, having “passed through our gates,” are protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The court rejected the government’s reliance on Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, noting that case involved an alien, whereas these petitioners had resided in the U.S. for years.

The court concluded that detention without an individualized bond hearing violated the petitioners’ due process rights, as the government failed to demonstrate that continued detention was necessary to ensure appearance or prevent danger.

“Petitioners are more than just names on a pleading,” the opinion stated. “Petitioners have lived in the United States for years or decades. Some... own property or work for locally owned businesses... Many are the primary breadwinners or essential caregivers for their families.”

U.S. Circuit Judge Murphy delivered a separate dissenting opinion, arguing that the statutory text and history show the government must detain these petitioners under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Murphy sided with the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, which had broadly read the statute to cover immigrants deemed “applicants for admission.”

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district courts in case Nos. 25-1965, 25-1969, 25-1978, and 25-1982.

Clay was joined by Judge Cole opinion. Murphy dissented.