The court construed ORS 426.335(5), which limits liability for actions taken pursuant to Oregon’s civil commitment statutes, to include decisions not to detain a person based on the detention criteria in ORS 426.232.
The case arose of J, an 18-year-old who jumped out of a rideshare car and ran off before his mother found him standing on the railing of the Fremont Bridge in Portland and took him to Unity Center for Behavioral Health.
After approximately 10 hours of evaluation, practitioners determined J did not meet the criteria for an involuntary hold and allowed him to leave. Two days later, J killed himself in a parking lot using a firearm.
J’s mother, Leila Hotaki Mesch, sued the defendants for negligence, alleging they failed to adequately assess his suicidal ideation and improperly discharged him following an interrupted suicide attempt.
The trial court granted summary judgment, finding the defendants immune under ORS 426.335(5). Mesch appealed, arguing the immunity statute applies only to decisions to detain, not to release, and that the statute violates the Oregon Constitution’s remedy clause.
Writing for the majority, Judge Powers held that ORS 426.232 necessarily contemplates two paths: detaining a person if they meet the criteria, or not detaining them if they do not.
Judge Powers wrote that a practitioner evaluating a person to determine whether that person is a danger to self or others and is in need of emergency care or treatment is an action pursuant to ORS 426.232, because without first making that determination, a practitioner is not permitted to take any other action listed in ORS 426.232.
The court also defined the immunity standard, ruling that “good faith” is a subjective standard of honest belief, while “probable cause” requires a substantial objective basis for believing more likely than not that the person did or did not meet detention criteria.
On the record, the court found the defendants established as a matter of law that they acted in good faith and on probable cause. The practitioners documented J’s change in behavior from aggressive and uncooperative to engaged and sincere, noting protective factors such as his ability to safety plan and his desire to start college.
Mesch argued the practitioners lacked probable cause because J’s sudden cooperation suggested deception. The court rejected this, noting the uncontroverted evidence showed J’s behavior changed after he calmed down and was no longer confronted with security.
The court also rejected Mesch’s constitutional challenge, ruling that ORS 426.335(5) is part of a comprehensive statutory framework balancing liberty interests with the state’s interest in providing treatment, and thus does not violate Article I, section 10 of the Oregon Constitution.
Judge Hellman dissented, arguing the text of ORS 426.232 authorizes only affirmative actions to detain, admit, or retain a person, and does not mention decisions to release or allow a person to leave.
Judge Hellman wrote, “I am unaware that any statutory authority is needed for a licensed independent practitioner to permit a person to exercise their personal liberty to leave a hospital or nonhospital facility.”
Mesch’s attorney Nadia H. Dahab did not immediately return a request for comment.
The panel included Presiding Judge Ortega, Judge Powers, and Judge Hellman.