WASHINGTON (LN) — The Supreme Court on Wednesday severely limited Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, holding that plaintiffs must prove intentional racial discrimination rather than showing a racially disparate impact to establish liability.
In Louisiana v. Callais, Justice Samuel Alito wrote for the majority that the government cannot use race as a predominant factor in drawing election districts even if necessary to comply with Section 2. The decision requires proof of a discriminatory purpose, a standard the court said aligns with equal protection jurisprudence.
Justice Elena Kagan dissented, arguing the majority’s interpretation renders Section 2 “all but a dead letter,” according to Dean Erwin Chemerinsky of UC Berkeley School of Law. Kagan wrote that requiring proof of discriminatory purpose contradicts the statute’s clear text and design. She noted that legislators rarely express racist motives, making such proof nearly impossible.
Chemerinsky described the ruling as the culmination of decades of decisions limiting voting rights protections. He cited City of Mobile v. Bolden, which held that proof of discriminatory purpose, not just impact, is required for constitutional violations. Congress responded in 1982 by amending Section 2 to expressly provide that disparate impact was sufficient for liability. The court in Callais gave no deference to that amendment.
Alito’s opinion relied on Shaw v. Reno, which held that using race as a predominant factor in districting violates equal protection unless it meets strict scrutiny. The majority rejected the argument that preventing discriminatory effects against voters of color constitutes a compelling interest sufficient to satisfy that standard.
The decision follows Shelby County v. Holder, which struck down the preclearance requirement of Section 5. Chemerinsky noted that Callais reflects the court giving no deference to Congress when legislating under the 15th Amendment.
The ruling also intersects with Rucho v. Common Cause, which held partisan gerrymandering claims are non-justiciable political questions. Chemerinsky warned that with Section 2 weakened, state legislatures can redraw maps to spread Black voters among districts or pack them into single districts, limiting their political strength without facing federal court challenges.
Chemerinsky noted that the court abandoned the approach from Cooper v. Harris, which suggested that sorting voters by race remains suspect even if race functions as a proxy for political characteristics. In Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, the court reversed a lower court’s equal protection finding, ruling that legislatures are presumed to act in good faith unless there is proof of racially discriminatory motive.
Kagan warned in her dissent that states may now draw districts for any political purpose, including purely partisan goals, regardless of racial effects. She argued that the State need do nothing more than announce a partisan gerrymander to avoid liability.