Key Points
- The Eleventh Court of Appeals reversed the part of the judgment holding Carter D. Copeland individually liable for MTI's breach of contract and rendered judgment that the non-operators take nothing from him.
- Assuming without deciding that the evidence supported the jury's alter-ego and actual-fraud findings, the court held there was legally insufficient evidence that Copeland received a direct personal benefit, as Section 21.223 of the Texas Business Organizations Code requires.
- The court held that a salary, intercompany transfers, management fees and loan reimbursements do not show a direct personal benefit unless the evidence connects them to the specific overcharges.
- The court held that the court-ordered audit did not violate MTI's due process rights and that, under paragraph 5 of the COPAS guidelines, Franks's audit notice initiated an audit of the joint account on behalf of all non-operators.
- The court affirmed the trial court's judgment against MTI in all other respects and held that MTI waived its argument about non-operators' unpaid bills by not pleading an affirmative defense.
A Texas appeals court on Nov. 19 reversed the part of a trial court judgment that made the majority owner of an oil and gas operator personally liable for the company's breach of its operating agreements, holding there was no evidence he received a "direct personal benefit" from the more than $2 million in overcharges that an audit uncovered.
Justice W. Stacy Trotter wrote for a panel of the Eleventh Court of Appeals that also included Chief Justice Bailey and Justice Williams. The court rendered judgment that the working-interest owners who sued "take nothing" from Carter D. Copeland, who owns 90% of Mineral Technologies Inc., known as MTI. It affirmed the rest of the trial court's judgment.
The opinion opens with the rule at the center of the case: the corporate structure "normally insulates shareholders, officers, and directors" from personal liability for a company's debts, and a court may disregard it, or pierce the corporate veil, when they abuse that privilege. Under Section 21.223 of the Texas Business Organizations Code, a shareholder answers for a corporation's contract obligations only if the shareholder used it to commit an actual fraud "primarily for the direct personal benefit" of that shareholder. The court held that a salary, intercompany transfers and the general advantages of ownership do not meet that test unless the evidence ties them to the specific overcharges.
The parties hold working interests in four properties they developed under four essentially identical joint operating agreements. The agreements adopted accounting guidelines from the Council of Petroleum Accountants Societies, or COPAS, procedures that the opinion, quoting an earlier decision, said are "attached to virtually every operating agreement."
Franks Exploration Co., one of the non-operators, notified MTI in December 2021 that it intended to audit MTI's books. After the auditor Franks hired, Carolyn Sczepanski, repeatedly tried without success to schedule the audit with MTI, Franks and two other owners sued in Glasscock County and sought an audit under Rule 172 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which lets a trial court appoint an auditor to investigate accounts. The trial court appointed Sczepanski under a Rule 11 agreement, which the opinion describes as a contract that relates to litigation. According to the opinion, MTI "consistently delayed, failed to respond, or only partially responded" to her requests, and her final report found about $2.2 million in unsubstantiated charges.
The owners voted to replace MTI with Black River Operating LLC, but MTI refused to give up operations. The non-operators then added Copeland as a defendant, and Hanley Petroleum LLC and LHAH Properties LLC filed cross-claims seeking the same relief. A jury found that MTI breached the agreements by failing to operate in a good and workmanlike manner, failing to allow access to its books and refusing to honor the removal vote. It also found Copeland responsible for MTI's conduct, and the trial court held him and MTI jointly and severally liable.
On appeal, the non-operators argued that Copeland used MTI to pass inflated invoices from Owl Energy Services, which they described as his service company, to the joint account. MTI then reimbursed Owl, they contended, and Owl paid the profits to Copeland through his salary. In their account, "MTI did not receive any benefit from this scheme, but instead was the conduit for Owl to [generate] profits that flowed directly" to Copeland.
The panel assumed, without deciding, that the evidence supported the jury's findings of alter ego and actual fraud, and resolved the veil-piercing issues on the benefit question alone. Copeland's salary from Owl "is not, on its own, evidence of a direct personal benefit to him," Trotter wrote, and the record held no evidence of what the salary was or whether it changed when the overcharges were made.
Copeland's testimony that anything benefiting his companies also benefited him consisted of "general, logical statements that apply to any business owner," the court held. Evidence that he used money funneled to MTI to reimburse himself for loans associated with an entity he formed for his children showed only that "corporate funds were used to satisfy a corporate debt." Evidence about management fees between the companies "does not connect the overcharges to Copeland at all," Trotter wrote.
"In sum, neither the evidence marshaled by the non-operators nor the record as a whole provides more than a scintilla of evidence that Copeland received a direct personal benefit from the complained-of overcharges," the opinion said. Without that link, Trotter wrote, "the jury could only speculate." Having reversed on that ground, the court did not reach a second challenge to the admission of what it called "Castleberry-factor evidence."
The court rejected MTI's attacks on the audit. MTI argued that the trial court let Sczepanski "unilaterally decide what documentation was required and whether sufficient supporting documentation had been provided," violating due process. "But this is precisely what MTI agreed to in the Rule 11 agreement," Trotter wrote. The opinion noted that when MTI later offered 240 invoices, only one matched the 159 transactions the auditor had selected.
MTI also argued that each non-operator had to give its own audit notice, which would have limited the relief available to every owner except Franks. The court read the audit provision of the COPAS guidelines to contemplate "that a single audit may serve the interests of multiple non-operators," calling MTI's demand for duplicative notices "antithetical to the text's prioritization of efficient, convenient accounting procedures." It held that Franks validly initiated the audit on behalf of all non-operators.
Rick G. Strange of Hamm Law Group, PLLC represented MTI and Copeland. John A. Davis of Davis, Gerald & Cremer, P.C. represented the non-operators. Anna Brandl of Kelly Hart & Hallman, LLP represented Hanley Petroleum and LHAH Properties.
The appeals court rendered judgment for Copeland on the non-operators' claims against him and affirmed the trial court's judgment against MTI in all other respects.