Key Points

  • The Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of International Trade's judgment sustaining Commerce's 25.86% antidumping duty rate for Kaptan Demir Celik Endustrisi ve Ticaret A.S.
  • The court held that Loper Bright did not apply because Kaptan and Commerce agreed that the time of sale is the date the material terms of sale are established.
  • The court read 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(i) as setting a starting point, not a presumption, and noted Kaptan's counsel conceded that reading defeats the authority challenge.
  • The court held Kaptan forfeited any argument against deferring to Commerce's reading of its own regulation by not addressing Kisor v. Wilkie.
  • Kaptan's own questionnaire responses, which said material terms could be amended until goods were shipped or invoiced, supplied substantial evidence for using the invoice date.

A federal appeals court on Nov. 13 upheld the Commerce Department's use of invoice dates to set antidumping duties on Turkish steel rebar, rejecting a producer's argument that the Supreme Court's 2024 decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo invalidated the agency's rule for deciding when a sale takes place.

A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a U.S. Court of International Trade judgment that sustained a 25.86% antidumping duty rate for Kaptan Demir Celik Endustrisi ve Ticaret A.S. Circuit Judge Stark wrote for the panel, which also included Circuit Judge Stoll and U.S. District Judge J. Campbell Barker of the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

The decision holds that Commerce's date-of-sale regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(i), sets a "starting point" rather than a legal presumption. It also holds that Loper Bright was not in play because Kaptan and the government agreed on what the statute means. Kaptan's own questionnaire answers, the panel found, supported the invoice date.

Under the Tariff Act of 1930, Commerce may impose antidumping duties on imports sold in the United States below "normal value," the price of the goods in the exporter's home market at a time reasonably corresponding to the time of the U.S. sale. The regulation directs Commerce normally to use the invoice date as the date of sale, but allows a different date if it better reflects when the material terms of sale were established.

Commerce imposed duties on Turkish rebar in July 2017. In a 2022 administrative review, it designated Kaptan a mandatory respondent, a company required to answer questionnaires and produce documents. Kaptan reported that Turkey was undergoing hyperinflation during the July 2021 to June 2022 review period, with an annualized inflation rate above 25 percent for multiple months.

Commerce used Kaptan's invoice dates and assigned a preliminary dumping margin of 29.30% in August 2023. Kaptan argued for its contract dates instead, saying Turkish prices rose rapidly between contract and invoice, its contracts never materially changed, and an internal board resolution barred changes without board approval. Commerce was not persuaded and set a final rate of 25.86% in December 2023.

Kaptan sued in the Court of International Trade, where the Rebar Trade Action Coalition intervened to support Commerce. Senior Judge Jane A. Restani sustained the rate and found it unnecessary to decide whether Commerce had authority to adopt the regulation, because the parties did not dispute the meaning of the statute.

On appeal, Kaptan argued that the rule's preference for the invoice date was inconsistent with the statute and could not survive without the agency deference the Supreme Court rejected in Loper Bright. "Kaptan’s efforts to manufacture an issue of statutory interpretation fail," Judge Stark wrote. Both sides, he noted, agreed that "time of sale" means the date on which the material terms of the transaction are established. "Hence, there is no need for us to engage in statutory interpretation or apply the Supreme Court’s teachings in Loper Bright," the court held.

"At most, Kaptan invites us to review Commerce’s interpretation of its own regulation," the opinion said, citing the Supreme Court's 2019 decision in Kisor v. Wilkie. Because Kaptan neither addressed Kisor nor briefed a challenge to Commerce's reading of the rule, the panel held that "it has forfeited any argument that we should not defer to Commerce’s interpretation of § 351.401."

Kaptan also argued that the Tariff Act is silent on the meaning of "time of sale" and that the regulation improperly filled that gap. Although Kaptan had not made that argument in the trade court, the panel addressed it and found no violation. "Although the Trade Court and Commerce describe the regulation as creating a presumption, we do not view it as such," Judge Stark wrote, adopting the coalition's description of the rule as a starting point. "The regulation does not impose any additional burden of production on a mandatory respondent," he added.

The opinion recorded that Kaptan's counsel conceded at oral argument that if the rule is only a starting point, "he has no argument that the regulation exceeds Commerce’s authority to adopt." "That is precisely our conclusion," the court wrote.

On the facts, the panel held that substantial evidence, meaning evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate, supported Commerce's choice. Kaptan's questionnaire responses stated that for U.S. sales "the parties may amend the latest shipment date, size breakdown, and, to a lesser extent, quantity until the goods are shipped." Commerce described the size breakdown as the specific price and quantity for each rebar product.

Kaptan argued that those responses were inaccurate. The panel found it noteworthy that "at no point during the investigation did Kaptan clarify its supposedly incomplete or inaccurate questionnaire responses." It also credited Commerce's finding that one version of a Kaptan contract indicated the size breakdown would come after signing, and held that the board resolution did not make Commerce's findings unreasonable.

The court declined to take up Kaptan's argument that it was being punished, by paying approximately $20 million more in duties, for honoring contract terms set before hyperinflation drove up its costs. "Whatever the merit of Kaptan’s complaint, a matter we do not reach, we are not permitted to impose our own policy preferences" on an agency whose actions are supported by substantial evidence, Judge Stark wrote.

Daniel L. Delnero of BGD Legal & Consulting LLC argued for Kaptan. Augustus Golden of the Commercial Litigation Branch of the Justice Department's Civil Division argued for the United States.

Because Kaptan raised no other challenge to how Commerce calculated the duty, the panel said its ruling on the date of sale required affirmance. The court affirmed the trade court's judgment, leaving the 25.86% rate in place, and ordered each party to bear its own costs.