Key Points
- The Federal Circuit affirmed the Merit Systems Protection Board's dismissal of Kathryn Walker's individual right of action appeal as filed 24 days after the statutory deadline.
- When the Office of Special Counsel notifies an employee that it has terminated its investigation, 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3)(A) requires the employee to file with the board within 60 days of that notice, even if the notice arrives more than 120 days after the employee's complaint.
- Subparagraph (B)'s 120-day period only lets an employee go to the board while the Special Counsel has not yet acted; the court held that it does not remove the 60-day limit once the Special Counsel issues its notice.
- The court relied on the statute's plain text, the surrounding provisions in §§ 1214(a)(4) and 1214(b)(2)(A)(i), and the rule against readings that produce absurd results or no limitations period at all.
- The court did not decide the deadline for an employee who never receives Special Counsel notice, did not reach Walker's hearing argument, and held that she had waived equitable tolling.
A federal employee who brings a whistleblower complaint to the Office of Special Counsel has 60 days to take the case to the Merit Systems Protection Board once the Special Counsel closes its investigation, even when the closure comes more than 120 days after the complaint was filed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled on Nov. 13.
The unsigned opinion, issued for a panel of Circuit Judges Prost, Taranto and Chen, affirmed the board's dismissal of an appeal by Kathryn Walker, a former Army transportation specialist. The board had found that Walker filed her individual right of action appeal 24 days after the deadline.
The ruling rejects the argument that a Special Counsel notice arriving after the 120-day mark leaves an employee with no filing deadline at all. "Once the Special Counsel acts, the 60-day deadline starts to run," the court wrote.
Walker worked for the Army from December 2021 to April 2025, according to the opinion. On Jan. 23, 2023, the Army proposed suspending her for 10 days on a charge of "Conduct Unbecoming a Federal Employee." She filed a whistleblower complaint with the Special Counsel the same day, and the Army imposed the suspension in May 2023.
The statute at issue, 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3), requires employees who lack a right to appeal directly to the board to seek relief from the Special Counsel before going to the board. It then opens the board's door in two ways. Under subparagraph (A), an employee may appeal within 60 days after the Special Counsel says it has terminated its investigation. Under subparagraph (B), an employee may appeal once 120 days have passed without word that the Special Counsel will seek corrective action on the employee's behalf.
Walker's 120th day fell on May 23, 2023, when she could have gone straight to the board, the court said. She did not. On May 31, 2023, about a week later, the Special Counsel told her it was closing its investigation and would not seek corrective action. The court calculated her 60-day deadline as Monday, July 31, 2023. She filed with the board on Aug. 24, 2023.
An administrative judge ordered Walker in June 2024 to show that her appeal was timely or that the deadline should be equitably tolled. Walker responded that subparagraph (B) made her appeal timely and that equitable tolling was "inapplicable." The judge dismissed the appeal in October 2024. Walker asked the full board to review that ruling, but the board lacked a quorum, so the judge's decision became the board's final decision.
Before the Federal Circuit, Walker argued that because the Special Counsel's notice came after the 120-day period, subparagraph (A)'s 60-day deadline no longer applied. As the court summarized her position, if the Special Counsel misses the 120-day mark, "no statute of limitations applies to filing an IRA appeal to the Board." The government relied mainly on a 1996 board decision, King v. Department of Health & Human Services, which had rejected the same argument because it led to an "absurd result" and "was inconsistent with principles of statutory construction and legislative intent."
The panel ruled against Walker on three grounds: the statute's plain language, its surrounding text and the absurdity of her reading. Subparagraph (B) applies only when an employee "has not been notified by the Special Counsel," the court said, and Walker had been notified. Once that notice issued, subparagraph (A) governed her deadline. "The purpose served by subparagraph (B) is to allow an employee who has not received a decision within 120 days to proceed before she receives such decision—not to allow unlimited time to appeal to the Board even after the Special Counsel's decision issues," the court wrote.
The court also rejected the reading that subparagraph (B) asks only whether notice had arrived by day 120. The statute's conditions are measured when the employee files with the board, the panel said, and the 120-day figure only sets the earliest date on which an employee may invoke subparagraph (B).
Neighboring provisions pointed the same way, the court said. Section 1214(a)(4) lets the Special Counsel keep pursuing relief for an employee who has gone to the board under subparagraph (B), but only with the employee's consent. A separate provision, § 1214(b)(2)(A)(i), gives the Special Counsel 240 days to decide whether there are reasonable grounds to believe a prohibited personnel practice occurred. That structure, the court said, shows the 120-day period is not a deadline the Special Counsel must meet. "Subparagraph (B) mitigates the employee's wait while the Special Counsel remains silent and at work; it does not indefinitely extend the employee's time after the Special Counsel has spoken," the panel wrote.
The court agreed with the government that Walker's reading would produce an absurd result. "Interpreting legislation to have no statute of limitations is particularly disfavored," the opinion said, citing an 1805 Supreme Court decision, Adams v. Woods, that it would be "utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws" to allow suits to "be brought at any distance of time." The panel concluded that "it was not Congress's intent to provide an unlimited amount of time for employees to file IRA appeals to the Board simply because the Special Counsel takes more than 120 days to issue its notification."
The opinion left several questions undecided. In a footnote, the court said it was not addressing the deadline for an employee who never receives notice from the Special Counsel. It did not reach Walker's argument that she was entitled to a hearing before the board. It also declined to consider equitable tolling, finding that Walker had waived the argument by telling the court in her brief that "the doctrine of equitable tolling was inapplicable."
Walker represented herself. The board was represented by Stephen Fung of its Office of the General Counsel.
The panel found Walker's remaining arguments unpersuasive and affirmed the board's dismissal of her appeal as untimely, with no costs awarded to either side.