Key Points
- The First Circuit vacated the dismissal of Thomas Marshall's as-applied Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which bars him from having guns because of two Massachusetts DUI convictions.
- The court held that its pre-Bruen precedent in United States v. Torres-Rosario no longer controls after United States v. Levasseur, and remanded for the district court to apply Bruen's historical analysis to Marshall's challenge to the background-check denial.
- Marshall lacks standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge to criminal enforcement of § 922(g)(1) based on intended possession, because he did not allege an intent to possess a firearm that was shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
- The court declined to water down the Susan B. Anthony List 'arguably proscribed' standing test for Second Amendment claims.
- The district court must also consider the Justice Department's new § 925(c) rights-restoration process and whether Marshall's purchase-based allegations support standing to challenge the criminal possession ban.
A federal appeals court has revived a New Hampshire man's Second Amendment challenge to the federal ban that stopped him from buying a gun because of two Massachusetts drunken-driving convictions, ordering a trial judge to measure the ban against the nation's history of gun regulation.
Writing for a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit that included Judges Lynch and Montecalvo, Chief Judge Barron on Nov. 13 vacated the dismissal of Thomas Marshall's lawsuit and sent it back to U.S. District Judge Paul J. Barbadoro in New Hampshire. The panel also held that Marshall lacked standing to stop federal prosecutors from charging him for simply possessing a gun. His complaint, the court said, never alleged that the gun he wanted had moved across state lines.
The ruling leaves Marshall with a narrower case aimed at the federal background-check system that blocked his purchase. The panel also concluded that the circuit's 2011 decision in United States v. Torres-Rosario no longer controls. That precedent, the panel wrote, "largely foreclosed as-applied Second Amendment challenges" to the ban.
The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), makes it a federal crime for anyone convicted of an offense punishable by more than a year in prison to possess a firearm "in or affecting commerce." According to the complaint, Marshall was convicted of driving under the influence in Massachusetts in 1997 and again in 2005, under a law carrying up to two and a half years of imprisonment. After he moved to New Hampshire in 2023, he tried to buy a gun and was told the FBI had denied the purchase because the convictions were "putatively prohibiting" under the federal statute.
Marshall sued in June 2024, stating that it was his "present intention and desire to purchase and possess a handgun and a long gun for self-defense within his home," and sought to bar enforcement of § 922(g)(1) and its "derivative regulations" against him.
Barbadoro dismissed the suit in June 2025. The judge acknowledged that the Supreme Court's 2022 decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen had announced a new framework for gun cases but concluded that Torres-Rosario remained binding. The district court also found that Marshall's "repeated drunk driving" was "ongoing reckless conduct" of "exactly the type that poses a serious threat to the community."
The First Circuit examined standing even though both sides agreed Marshall had it, and weighed his possession and purchase allegations separately. The possession theory failed. Under the Supreme Court's 2014 decision in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, a person who sues before being charged must show that the planned conduct is "arguably proscribed" by the challenged law. Citing the Supreme Court's 2026 ruling in United States v. Hemani, Barron wrote that § 922(g) requires the government to show a firearm was "shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce," while Marshall's complaint described the guns he wanted only as a "handgun" or a "long gun."
"Simply put, § 922(g)(1) does not make it a crime—even arguably—for Marshall to possess any firearm just because it is one," Barron wrote. "It makes it a crime for him to possess one that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce."
The panel declined to infer that any gun Marshall bought would have come from out of state, noting that New Hampshire had at least 30 federally licensed firearms manufacturing facilities in 2023. "We do not dispute that most firearms in this country have traveled in interstate commerce," Barron wrote. "But Marshall never develops an argument as to why that reality matters."
The court said it had "no reason to water down" the Susan B. Anthony test in Marshall's case. The Second Amendment is not a "second-class right," Barron wrote, quoting Bruen, but "it also is not a preferred one."
The purchase theory fared better. The panel left intact Barbadoro's conclusion that Marshall had standing to challenge use of the background-check system to block his purchases. On the merits, Barron pointed to the circuit's September 2026 decision in United States v. Levasseur, which clarified that as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) are analyzed under Bruen. That framework asks whether a restriction "is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation."
"The District Court was properly attentive to the law of the circuit doctrine in concluding that Torres-Rosario controlled," Barron wrote. "But at least in light of our decision in Levasseur, we no longer think that Torres-Rosario controls."
The panel signaled that the difference between buying and possessing could matter on remand, writing that "restrictions on the commercial sale of firearms might raise distinct issues from a criminal prohibition on the mere possession of a firearm," though it did not decide the point.
The opinion also addressed a new Justice Department rule, implementing 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), that lets people barred from having guns apply to the attorney general to restore their rights. The parties dispute whether that process forecloses Marshall's challenge, but they "at the very least agree that the new restoration process presents new questions that the District Court has yet to address," Barron wrote.
Kyle Singhal, with Hopwood & Singhal PLLC on the brief, appeared for Marshall. Joshua K. Handell of the Justice Department appeared for the appellees.
The case returns to the district court, which must apply Bruen to the background-check challenge, weigh the restoration process and, if relevant, the scope of any equitable relief. The district court will also decide, if the question is not moot, whether Marshall's purchase allegations give him standing to challenge the criminal possession ban itself.