Key Points

  • The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Khatibi v. Yip, No. 25-1240, on November 16, 2026.
  • The denial leaves in place the Ninth Circuit's holding in Khatibi v. Hawkins, 145 F. 4th 1139 (2025), that CME courses eligible for California Medical Board credit are government speech, defeating a compelled-speech challenge to the state's implicit-bias curriculum requirement.
  • Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, dissented, arguing the Ninth Circuit collapsed the three Shurtleff v. Boston factors into a single question about how heavily the state regulates CME.
  • Thomas urged the Court to reconsider the Shurtleff test and to ask instead whether the government is speaking or regulating private expression; Justice Gorsuch would have granted the petition.

The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday declined to hear a challenge to California's requirement that continuing medical education courses for physicians include material on implicit bias, leaving in place an appeals court ruling that the content of state-credited courses is the government's own speech and is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny.

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, dissented from the denial of certiorari. Justice Gorsuch would have granted the petition, according to the brief order.

The order leaves standing a 2025 decision by the Ninth Circuit, Khatibi v. Hawkins, which held that "CMEs eligible for Board credit constitute government speech." Under that ruling, instructors who object to the state's mandated content cannot bring a compelled-speech claim. Thomas wrote that the reasoning would let governments escape constitutional review simply by regulating heavily. "A State cannot regulate its way out of First Amendment scrutiny," Thomas wrote.

California-licensed physicians must complete 50 hours of approved continuing medical education, known as CME, every two years, according to the dissent. Those courses are often organized by private entities, certified by private accreditors and taught by private instructors, and the state does not preapprove course content, though it reserves the right to audit courses.

In 2019, the California Legislature added a requirement that, after Jan. 1, 2022, all CME courses "contain curriculum that includes the understanding of implicit bias." Courses satisfy the rule by including examples of how implicit bias "affects perceptions and treatment decisions of physicians and surgeons, leading to disparities in health outcomes," or strategies to address how unintended biases may contribute to health care disparities.

The challengers were Dr. Azadeh Khatibi, a California-licensed ophthalmologist who creates and teaches CME courses, and Do No Harm, a nonprofit corporation with at least one member who teaches such courses. According to their complaint, as quoted in the dissent, Khatibi "disagrees that implicit bias is the primary factor driving disparities in healthcare" and does not want to devote time to the subject in her courses. They challenged the requirement as compelling speech in violation of the First Amendment.

A federal district court in California dismissed the complaint on the theory that the requirement "constitutes government speech," and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The appeals court applied the test from Shurtleff v. Boston, a 2022 Supreme Court decision that directs courts to weigh the history of the expression, the public's likely perception of who is speaking, and the extent of government control over the message.

At each step, Thomas wrote, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the breadth of California's regulation. The panel reasoned that "licensees could attribute approved CMEs' content to California" because "their profession is heavily regulated," and it cited "California's extraordinary control over accredited CMEs." Thomas quoted Judge VanDyke, who dissented from the Ninth Circuit's denial of rehearing en banc, as saying the panel's "approach boil[ed] down to a single-factor analysis: does the government 'heavily' or 'actively' regulate CMEs?"

"In its blinkered application of the Shurtleff factors, the Ninth Circuit lost sight of the core government-speech inquiry," Thomas wrote, describing that inquiry as whether the government is speaking for itself or regulating private expression. Thomas wrote that the court had previously found government speech where the government controlled the message itself, as with government-sponsored beef advertisements, monuments in a public park and government-issued license plates, but not where it merely ran the system through which private messages passed, as with trademarks and the flags at issue in Shurtleff.

Even under the three-factor test, Thomas doubted that California's rule qualified as government speech. The state has not historically used CME courses to communicate its own messages, Thomas wrote, and the Ninth Circuit itself acknowledged that Khatibi "plausibly alleged facts suggesting that attendees treat her as the person responsible for CME content." The appeals court, Thomas added, "did not identify any state law that requires private speakers in a CME course to express a particular viewpoint—even on contestable medical issues."

Thomas wrote that the decision's implications extended beyond medicine. The dissent asked whether, under the Ninth Circuit's view, California could require CME instructors to deliver the state's preferred message on abortion or on gender-transition surgery, and whether the reasoning would reach other licensed professions. "At the next statewide legal conference at which lectures are offered for continuing legal education, could California require a keynote speaker to oppose racial preferences in law firm hiring?" Thomas wrote.

Thomas went further and urged the court to reconsider Shurtleff itself. Thomas had joined Justice Alito's concurrence in that case, which warned that the three-factor test could lead courts to conclude that extensive regulation turns private messages into government speech. "As the Ninth Circuit's decision shows, those concerns were prescient," Thomas wrote. "It cannot be the case that compelled speech becomes government speech because the government has compelled the speech."

In place of the factor test, Thomas proposed asking whether the government is "speaking" or "regulating private expression," drawing on the Alito concurrence's description of government speech as "purposeful communication of a governmentally determined message by a person acting within the scope of a power to speak for the government." Under that approach, Thomas wrote, Khatibi and Do No Harm's members share their own messages in their private capacities, and when the government "requires private speakers to communicate the government's viewpoint, the First Amendment applies."

Joshua Paul Thompson of the Pacific Legal Foundation is counsel of record for Khatibi and Do No Harm, and Zach ZhenHe Tan of the California Department of Justice is counsel of record for the Medical Board officials, according to the Supreme Court's docket.

Thomas wrote that the court should not allow the doctrine to be used as "a cover for censorship" or a cloak for compelled speech, and dissented "because this case provided an opportunity to clarify that aspect of our government-speech doctrine."