Key Points

  • The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a quo warranto action that challenged Thomas Hawley Tuberville's eligibility, as the Republican nominee for governor, under the constitution's seven-year residency requirement.
  • The court held that a primary-election contest heard by the party's state executive committee under Ala. Code §§ 17-13-70 through 17-13-89 is the exclusive method to challenge a party nominee's qualifications before the general election, and that § 17-16-44 bars circuit-court jurisdiction otherwise.
  • Resolving a question it had reserved in 1964 and 1996, the court held that a party nominee does not exercise any public office, so the quo warranto statute does not authorize an action against a nominee.
  • The court did not decide whether Tuberville meets the residency requirement. The Republican Party's State Executive Committee denied a residency contest on June 14, 2026, and the opinion notes there is no statutory right to appeal a committee's decision to the courts.

The Alabama Supreme Court ruled on Oct. 9 that state courts have no power to hear a lawsuit seeking to remove Thomas Hawley Tuberville as the Republican nominee for governor on the ground that he fails the state constitution's seven-year residency requirement.

In an unsigned per curiam opinion, the court affirmed the Montgomery Circuit Court's dismissal of the suit brought by Brook Lynn Dorgan and Justin Jude LeBlanc. Chief Justice Stewart and Justices Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, McCool and Parker concurred. Justices Shaw and Cook recused themselves.

The State Executive Committee of the Alabama Republican Party has already ruled on Tuberville's eligibility, and the committee ruled for him in June. The court said its decisions have generally adhered to the rule that a primary-election contest heard by the party is "the exclusive method authorized by law to challenge a party nominee's qualification for office before the general election." The court also noted that there is no statutory right to appeal the committee's decision to the circuit court or to the Supreme Court.

The justices did not decide where Tuberville has lived. "The question whether Tuberville meets the residency requirement for the office of governor is not before this Court," the opinion said. The only issue on appeal was whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear the case at all.

Article V, Section 117 of the Alabama Constitution provides that the governor "shall have been … [a] resident citizen[] of this state at least seven years next before the date of [his or her] election."

According to the opinion, Tuberville won a majority of the votes in the Republican primary on May 19, 2026, and the party certified him to the Alabama Secretary of State as its nominee on May 27. His primary opponent, whom the opinion does not name, then filed a contest with the party arguing that he failed the residency requirement. After an evidentiary hearing, the executive committee issued a written decision on June 14 finding that Tuberville met the legal requirements to be governor, and it denied the contest.

Three days later, Dorgan and LeBlanc filed a quo warranto action in Montgomery Circuit Court. Quo warranto is, in words the court quoted from its earlier decisions, "a common law writ used to determine whether one is properly qualified and eligible to hold a public office." The two sued as relators. They asked the court to "issue a writ of quo warranto finding that Tuberville is not lawfully eligible to be the certified nominee or to hold the office of Governor."

Tuberville moved to dismiss on June 22. He relied on Section 17-16-44 of the Alabama Code, which the opinion described as the "jurisdiction-stripping statute." That statute provides that "[n]o jurisdiction exists in or shall be exercised by any judge or court to entertain any proceeding for ascertaining the legality, conduct, or results of any election," except where another statute specifically grants that authority. The circuit court dismissed the case. It reasoned that Tuberville, as a nominee, did not yet hold a public office that quo warranto could reach.

The Supreme Court agreed on two grounds. The first was the primary-contest statutes, Sections 17-13-70 through 17-13-89, which allow a primary result to be contested when the winner "was not eligible to the office sought at the time of the declaration of nomination." For a statewide office, the party's state executive committee hears and tries the contest, and it may subpoena witnesses and documents.

The court relied on its 1964 decision in Ex parte Skidmore. That case held that, once a party committee's jurisdiction is invoked, "the committee acquires exclusive jurisdiction to hear the contest, and the circuit court is without power to invade or defeat such jurisdiction."

The relators argued that the jurisdiction-stripping statute did not apply because they were not challenging the conduct or results of the primary. The court rejected that argument. It held that their claim of ineligibility fell within a category the primary-contest statutes list as a ground for a contest. Quoting its 2008 decision in Roper v. Rhodes, in which a losing county school-board candidate sought quo warranto against the primary winner, the court said that if the relators won, the results of the primary and the party contest "would be affected -- indeed they would be negated."

The second ground was the quo warranto statute itself, which authorizes the writ "[w]hen any person usurps, intrudes into or unlawfully holds or exercises any public office." The court acknowledged that it "has never directly answered whether a quo warranto action may be used to oust a party nominee between a primary election and a general election." It had reserved that question in State ex rel. Norrell v. Key in 1964 and again in Johnson v. Roberson in 1996.

The relators argued that a nominee is a "quasi-officer," relying on language in Norrell that "[t]he holder of a certificate of nomination has the status of a quasi officer." The court instead applied the definition of public office from its 1981 decision in State ex rel. Gray v. King, under which "the term 'public office' implies an authority to exercise some portion of the sovereign power, either by enacting, executing or administering the laws."

"Alabama law does not vest a party nominee 'with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government,'" the court wrote. "Accordingly, we hold that a party's nominee for election to public office does not exercise any public office. Thus, a quo warranto action is not authorized against a party nominee."

In a footnote, the court added that a separate provision, Section 6-6-598, limits quo warranto where an election contest is available. That section provides that "[t]he validity of an election which may be contested under this Code cannot be tried under [the quo warranto statutes]."

Because the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held that the lower court "properly dismissed the action." The court affirmed the judgment. The opinion remains subject to formal revision before publication in the Southern Reporter.