Key Points

  • The Fourth District held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a remittitur of a $700,000 past-and-future medical-expense award, because the evidence supported at most $47,573.88 in past expenses and a possible $86,000 neck surgery.
  • The court held that future medical expenses are recoverable only when reasonably certain to be incurred and proved by some direct evidence of their cost, and that testimony that treatment might possibly occur is not enough.
  • On remand the trial court must order a remittitur; if the plaintiff rejects it, the trial court may limit a retrial to past and future medical expenses.
  • The court affirmed the amended final judgment joining Allstate under section 627.4136(4) and preserving the plaintiff's ability to pursue future claims, including bad faith, against the insurer.
  • The panel distinguished Illinois Union Insurance Co. v. McGinley (Fla. 2d DCA 2025) because here no new complaint or claim was filed against the insurer in the case.

A Florida appeals court on Wednesday ordered a reduction of a $700,000 jury award for a girl's medical expenses in a Broward County car-crash case. The court ruled that the trial evidence supported only a fraction of that sum. It also upheld a judgment that leaves her free to pursue a later bad-faith claim against the driver's insurer, Allstate.

A three-judge panel of Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's refusal to reduce the award. It sent the case back for the trial court to order a remittitur. Judge May wrote the opinion, and Judges Shepherd and Shaw concurred. If the plaintiff rejects the lower figure, the court wrote, the trial court may hold a new trial limited to past and future medical expenses.

The decision splits the consolidated appeals. The driver, James Douglas Castellano, and Allstate won on damages. The court held that an award for future medical costs needs direct evidence of what treatment will cost, not testimony that treatment might happen. Allstate lost its bid to strike judgment language preserving claims against it beyond its $25,000 policy limit. The panel distinguished Illinois Union Insurance Co. v. McGinley, a 2025 Second District decision on which the insurer relied.

The plaintiff was 10 in February 2018. She was riding in the back seat of her father's car when it collided with Castellano's truck. She was in a second accident within months, and her claims from that crash were resolved before trial. Her parents, Kevin Antonio and Nikki Zembal, sued individually and on her behalf.

At trial, her doctors testified by videotape. Dr. Ellowitz, who saw her soon after the first crash, determined in July 2018 that she had reached "maximum medical improvement." He did not think she needed aggressive or invasive treatment. Dr. Coats, a neurosurgeon, testified that she might need a discectomy in the future. He put the hospitalization at $90,000 to $100,000 and the procedure at $25,000 to $30,000. A defense expert, Dr. Geoffrey Negin, testified that an X-ray taken after the 2018 crash looked "normal" and "appropriate for [her] age."

In closing, the plaintiff's side put past medical expenses at $47,573.88 and future medical expenses at $106,500. It asked for $24,000 a year in pain and suffering over 70 years, for a total request of $1,834,073.88. Defense counsel disputed Castellano's negligence and any permanent injury. Defense counsel suggested $10,000 in non-economic damages if the jury found him negligent.

The jury found both drivers negligent. It assigned 30 percent of the fault to Castellano and 70 percent to the girl's father. It found a permanent injury and awarded $700,000 in past and future medical expenses and $10,000 for pain and suffering. The plaintiff sought an additur, arguing the pain-and-suffering award was inexplicably low next to the medical award. The defense sought a remittitur. The trial court denied both. An amended final judgment, reduced by the father's share of fault, entitled the plaintiff to $193,125.99 against Castellano.

On appeal, the defendants argued the medical award could not exceed $134,240.55. They contended that any head or shoulder treatment was attributable only to the second accident. The plaintiff argued the award fit her young age and the long-lasting effects of her injuries. She said her monthly psychotherapy appointments could cost $250,000 over her expected lifespan. She put the lifetime cost of her weekly "peak performance" visits at $650,000.

The panel sided with the defendants. "Florida law restricts recovery of future medical expenses to those expenses reasonably certain to be incurred," the court wrote, quoting a 2018 Fifth District decision. It also quoted its own 2016 ruling: "Testimony or evidence that certain treatments might possibly be obtained in the future cannot merit an award of future medical expenses."

"At best, the evidence supported past medical expenses of $47,573.88 and the possibility of neck surgery costing $86,000 in the future," Judge May wrote. The future therapy appointments, the court added, "were not testified to in any detail at trial." The court said the plaintiff had "focused on pain and suffering and non-economic damages."

The second issue turned on Florida's nonjoinder statute, Section 627.4136. Subsection (4) allows a liability insurer to be joined as a defendant "at the time a judgment is entered" for the purpose of entering final judgment. After the verdict, the plaintiff moved to join Allstate, which had not been a party. The amended judgment limited the amount against Allstate to Castellano's $25,000 policy limit. It added that the limit "shall not prejudice, in any manner whatsoever" the plaintiff's ability to recover the entire judgment from the insurer, "including, but not limited to a claim for insurance bad-faith."

According to the court, Allstate claimed that the paragraph reached beyond the trial court's jurisdiction and "authorizes an unpled bad faith claim." It asked the appellate court to order its removal as a defendant and to strike that paragraph. It also sought removal of bolded language in a separate paragraph in which the trial court retained jurisdiction over matters including fees and costs.

The panel rejected that request. In McGinley, the court wrote, the final judgment referred to "continuing litigation" against the insurer in the same case. The day after the trial court's pronouncement there, the parties filed amended complaints adding multiple new claims against the insurer. "Here, however, the trial court merely added the insurer in the final judgment and the subsequent amended final judgment," Judge May wrote. "The judgment merely clarified that the plaintiff was not precluded from pursuing future claims against the insurer."

Lawyers for Allstate included Kevin D. Franz of Boyd & Jenerette, P.A.; the plaintiffs were represented by Daniel A. Bushell of Bushell Law, P.A. Castellano was represented by John P. Joy of Walton Lantaff Schroeder & Carson LLP.

The court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the case to the Broward County circuit court to order a remittitur on the medical-expense award. The opinion states that it is not final until the court disposes of any timely-filed motion for rehearing.