Key Points
- The Fourth District affirmed final summary judgment for the bar under section 768.125, Florida's dram shop statute.
- The court held no genuine dispute of material fact existed that the bar knew the plaintiff was habitually addicted to alcohol, because she was an anonymous, first-time patron whose behavior was, by her own testimony, unremarkable.
- Relying on Ellis v. N.G.N. of Tampa and Fleuridor v. Surf Café, the court held that serving drinks to a patron for the first time, without more, is not sufficient evidence to impute knowledge of habitual addiction.
- The court distinguished Roster v. Moulton, in which a first-time patron drank heavily in a short period, left and returned, and was twice asked to leave for being loud and argumentative.
- Judge Lott, concurring, wrote that Roster was wrongly decided because the statute requires actual knowledge of a habitual addiction, which expert testimony about tolerance on a single occasion does not show, and urged the court to consider receding from it in an appropriate case.
A Florida appeals court on Wednesday upheld a bar's victory in a lawsuit brought by a customer who, according to her complaint, was struck by a vehicle on Interstate 95 after drinking there, ruling that her calm behavior during a single visit did not show the bar knew she was an alcoholic.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for Family 5 Inc., which does business as Whistle Stop, against Samantha L. Croteau. Chief Judge Gerber wrote for the three-judge panel, joined by Associate Judge Marlon J. Weiss and Judge Lott. Lott also wrote a concurrence arguing that the court's 1992 decision in Roster v. Moulton, the precedent Croteau relied on most heavily, was wrongly decided.
Florida's dram shop statute generally shields sellers of alcohol from liability for injuries caused by an intoxicated customer of lawful drinking age, with an exception for a seller who "knowingly serves a person habitually addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages." The ruling holds that serving drinks to a patron for the first time, without more, is not sufficient evidence to impute to the bar knowledge that she was habitually addicted to alcohol.
According to Croteau's complaint, she was a patron of the bar on March 10 and 11, 2021, and drove away intoxicated. Her vehicle got a flat tire on I-95, and she was struck as a pedestrian while trying to cross the highway to seek help. Her blood alcohol level at the hospital was .234, the complaint alleged.
Croteau testified in depositions that she was a long-time alcoholic, but also that her evening at the bar was uneventful. The trial court's order recounted her testimony that she "just sat there to [herself] and just watched tv," and was "quiet" and "demure." Palm Beach County Circuit Judge James Sherman found no evidence that she showed "any outward indication that she was a habitual alcoholic other than, as contended by Plaintiff, that she had approximately 2.5 drinks worth of alcohol and sat quietly from 6:08 to 9:50."
Croteau argued that her composure was itself evidence, contending in her summary judgment response that appearing sober after several drinks "is a sign that a patron is an alcoholic, not that the patron isn't an alcoholic." Her medical expert attested by affidavit that "a habitual alcoholic who has developed a high tolerance for alcohol will appear to not be intoxicated with alcohol consumption."
Sherman rejected that theory. "If a patron's composed silence on one occasion was sufficient indicia of habitual alcoholism to defeat summary judgment in a dram shop case, it is impossible to conceive of a case that would not create a jury issue, rendering the protections afforded by the statute illusory," the trial judge wrote.
On appeal, the panel reviewed the ruling de novo. Like the trial court, it accepted that Croteau's testimony created a factual dispute over whether she was habitually addicted to alcohol, leaving only the question of whether the bar knew it.
Gerber relied on the Florida Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Ellis v. N.G.N. of Tampa Inc., which held that "[s]erving an individual multiple drinks on one occasion would be insufficient, in and of itself, to establish that the vendor knowingly served a habitual drunkard alcoholic beverages." The opinion also cited the Fourth District's 2001 decision in Fleuridor v. Surf Café, which affirmed summary judgment for a bar whose patron was unknown to the staff and had bought up to four drinks over two to three hours.
In Roster, by contrast, a first-time customer drank eight to 10 beers and two shots of tequila in an hour and a half, left, drank another beer elsewhere, and returned to be served again. The manager twice asked him to leave because he became loud and argumentative, and two experts swore in affidavits that his heavy drinking without visible impairment would have put a reasonable server on notice of his addiction. The court reversed summary judgment for that bar.
Whistle Stop argued that Croteau drank over a much longer period, never left and came back, and never became loud or argumentative, and Gerber agreed. "Unlike the Roster patron, the plaintiff here was an anonymous patron, whose behavior during her visit to the bar was, by her own statements, unremarkable," Gerber wrote.
Lott joined the majority in full but wrote separately "to note my view that Roster is wrongly decided because its holding is ungrounded from the statutory language." The statute, Lott wrote, requires actual knowledge, not that a server "should have known," and it "does not require expert testimony." The concurrence noted that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders has redefined alcohol disorders between editions, while the statute's words carry their ordinary meaning.
"It is difficult to fathom how a server could have actual knowledge that a person is addicted to alcohol by habit if they have observed that person imbibe on only a single occasion, however remarkable that occasion might be," Lott wrote. "In other words—anyone can have too many drinks," the concurrence continued.
Of Roster, Lott wrote that the patron "handled his liquor well, until he didn't," and that "the expert affidavits about his apparent alcohol tolerance added nothing to that inquiry." Lott concluded: "In sum, Roster passed the buck from the statutory language to expert opinion, and reached the wrong result in turn. In an appropriate case, we should consider whether to recede from it." Weiss concurred without writing separately.
Lawyers for Croteau included Bard D. Rockenbach of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A.; the bar was represented by Jack R. Reiter of GrayRobinson, P.A.
The decision is not final until the court disposes of any timely-filed motion for rehearing.