Key Points
- The Supreme Court of Texas held that a superintendent delegated authority only to make budgeted purchases under $25,000 lacked authority to sign uncapped contingent-fee consulting contracts that produced an $817,500 bill.
- Because the superintendent exceeded his authority, the contracts were not "properly executed" under Local Government Code Chapter 271, and the Edcouch-Elsa Independent School District retained its governmental immunity.
- The court rejected the consultants' proposed "rebuttable presumption of authority" for contingent-fee contracts and held that the consultants bore the burden of showing a waiver of immunity, including that the contracts were budgeted.
- The court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment granting the district's plea to the jurisdiction, while stating it did not foreclose the board from amending its budget to approve some payment.
- Justice Hawkins concurred, writing that the case should have been resolved on the petition, contracts and board policy alone and that Miranda's fact-based jurisdictional challenge "should be a last recourse, not a first impulse."
The Supreme Court of Texas held on Nov. 20 that a Hidalgo County school district is immune from a lawsuit over an $817,500 bill from grant-writing consultants. The court reasoned that the superintendent who hired them had authority only to make budgeted purchases under $25,000 and could not commit the district to an uncapped contingent fee.
Justice Jane N. Bland, writing for the court, held that the contracts therefore were not "properly executed" under Chapter 271, subchapter I, of the Local Government Code, a 2005 law that waives local governments' immunity from suit over certain written contracts. The court affirmed a judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas granting the Edcouch-Elsa Independent School District's plea to the jurisdiction. Justice Kyle D. Hawkins filed a concurring opinion.
The ruling holds that an open-ended contingent fee falls outside a delegation capped at a dollar amount, even when the district owes nothing at signing. "Rodriguez had no authority to bind the district to unlimited or unascertainable liability, however far in the future," Bland wrote. The court also rejected the consultants' request for "a rebuttable presumption of authority" for contingent-fee contracts.
According to the opinion, superintendent Gregory Rodriguez signed contracts in November 2020 with Comprehensive Training Center LLC and ERI Funding Group Inc. to help the district secure a federal grant "offered to schools with high poverty rates." The consultants offered either an $8,000 flat fee or a contingent fee. Rodriguez chose the contingent fee, agreeing to pay ERI Funding Group 7.114% and Comprehensive Training Center 2.886% of the grant money awarded.
The district received a grant worth about $8 million, which it used for student academic support and extracurricular programs. Rodriguez terminated the contracts in September 2021 and testified that he had not asked the board's permission either to enter into them or to end them. The board declined his request to approve a settlement payment, and in January 2022 the consultants sued for breach of contract, seeking about $817,500.
The district's policy required board approval for "any single, budgeted purchase of goods or services that costs $25,000 or more." The trial court denied the district's plea. The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the district, holding that Rodriguez lacked authority because the district had not budgeted for grant-writing services.
Before the Supreme Court, the consultants argued that their fees were not an ascertainable cost when Rodriguez agreed to them, so the $25,000 limit did not apply. Bland answered that "the limits on Rodriguez's authority to bind the district, however, were known." She wrote that "an uncapped contingent fee, in this case resulting in an $817,500 invoice, falls outside the superintendent's authority to make budgeted (and thus ascertainable) purchases costing less than $25,000."
The proposed presumption, Bland wrote, "does not comport with the monetary limit on this superintendent's contracting authority" and conflicts with the Education Code's limited allowance for board-delegated authority, "which may not be implied." The court also rejected the consultants' argument that the district could recoup their fees from the federal grant. It said the record did not show the district could use grant funds that way, and a footnote quoted Texas Education Agency guidance that "[g]rant funds must not be used to pay for grant writing services."
On budgeting, the court held that the consultants had reversed the burden of proof, which falls on a party suing the government to establish a waiver of immunity. The consultants had suggested that broad budget categories such as "General Administration" might cover grant-writing services. The court said that suggestion did not contradict Rodriguez's testimony that the board was unaware of his effort and had not budgeted for it, and it agreed with the court of appeals that "Rodriguez had no authority to make unbudgeted purchases at any cost."
Hawkins agreed that the district was immune but wrote that "this could have been a simpler case." In his view, the board policy and the contracts, which set "no stated ceiling on liability," decided the question. "An unbounded commitment is not a commitment under $25,000," he wrote, and the case "could have been dismissed swiftly at the outset, on the face of the petition, with minimal expense and burden."
Instead, Hawkins wrote, the parties subpoenaed witnesses, took depositions and gathered affidavits. He placed much of the blame on the court's 2004 decision in Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, which allows a government to challenge the facts behind a claimed waiver of immunity. That kind of challenge, he wrote, leads parties to pursue discovery. Hawkins called that regime of "jurisdictional discovery" conceptually problematic. "The entire point of immunity from suit—as distinct from immunity from liability—is that the government and its officials should not bear the burdens of litigation until jurisdiction is secure," he wrote.
Hawkins proposed a two-step test for disputes over proper execution. First, a court would look only at the petition, the contracts and the entity's publicly adopted policy. Second, it would ask whether those documents show as a matter of law that the signer lacked authority. Miranda's factual challenge, he wrote, "should be a last recourse, not a first impulse."
The case was argued Sept. 15.
Robert B. Gilbreath of Hawkins Parnell & Young LLP represented Comprehensive Training Center and ERI Funding Group. Curtis L. Cukjati of Martin & Cukjati, LLP represented Comprehensive Training Center and ERI Funding Group. Edward Smith of O'Hanlon, Demerath & Castillo represented the Edcouch-Elsa Independent School District.
The affirmance leaves in place the dismissal of the consultants' suit. Bland wrote that the court did not "cast doubt on a district's ability to arrange for services based on a contingent fee, exercising its own authority under the Education Code." The court also said it did "not foreclose board action to amend the budget approving some payment to the consultants," and it noted that a board may amend its budget or adopt a supplementary budget to cover "necessary unforeseen expenses."