Key Points
- The Supreme Court of Texas, in a per curiam opinion, conditionally granted mandamus, vacated the court of appeals' order denying the relators' Rule 29.3 motions and directed that court to reconsider them.
- The court held that the existence of a standstill agreement like this one does not establish that appellants will not suffer irreparable harm if temporary relief is denied, nor that they will; each case must be evaluated on its own merits.
- The court wrote that the judiciary should encourage standstill agreements, under which the government voluntarily complies with a superseded injunction to avoid emergency litigation pending appeal.
- Because the order was vacated, the standstill agreement remains in effect, and the commission will continue complying with the temporary injunction's terms.
- The court expressed no view on whether the relators are entitled to Rule 29.3 relief and noted that a merits decision in the underlying appeal may moot the motions.
The Supreme Court of Texas on Nov. 20 vacated an appeals court order that denied temporary relief to four challengers suing a state health official based solely on the state's agreement to keep obeying a lower-court injunction. The appeals court's ruling "turns the agreement on its head," the justices wrote, because denying relief hastened the end of the very truce the parties struck to avoid emergency litigation.
In a per curiam opinion issued without oral argument, the court conditionally granted the petition for writ of mandamus. It vacated the court of appeals' order denying the challengers' motions for temporary relief and directed that court to reconsider them. Justice Sullivan did not participate in the decision.
The ruling keeps the state's promise in force for now. Because the order was vacated, the court wrote, "it is as if the court never ruled, and the standstill agreement remains in effect." Under that agreement, the Texas Health and Human Services Commission and its employees will continue to comply with a temporary injunction that, among other things, barred the agency's executive commissioner from executing certain contracts.
The challengers are Cook Children's Health Plan, Texas Children's Health Plan, Superior Health Plan, Inc. and Wellpoint Insurance Company. They brought ultra vires claims against the commission's executive commissioner. The trial court denied the commissioner's plea to the jurisdiction and issued the temporary injunction.
The commissioner then filed an interlocutory appeal. Under Texas law, that appeal automatically superseded the injunction, the opinion said, citing Section 6.001(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and the court's 2021 decision in In re Texas Education Agency.
To avoid dueling emergency filings over whether the injunction should be enforced during the appeal, the parties entered into what the opinion calls a "standstill agreement." In it, the state agreed: "Notwithstanding any supersedeas rights," the commission and its employees and agents "will comply with the terms of the Temporary Injunction Order until the latest of" three events.
Those events were 30 days after the end of the 89th Regular Session of the Texas Legislature; a ruling from the appellate court on any request for temporary orders under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.3 filed within seven days of the appeal's reinstatement; or the end of any mandamus proceeding in the Texas Supreme Court reviewing such a ruling, if filed within seven days of it.
The challengers then asked the court of appeals for Rule 29.3 relief. On Nov. 12, 2025, that court said no. It reasoned that under the agreement, the commissioner "will continue to abide by the terms of the trial court's temporary injunction regardless of how this Court rules on Appellees' motions until the Texas Supreme Court resolves the issue."
Because its decision "will not affect [the Commissioner's] adherence to the terms of the temporary injunction," the appeals court concluded, the challengers "failed to demonstrate that they will suffer irreparable harm" without Rule 29.3 relief.
The challengers petitioned the Supreme Court to vacate that order, to direct the appeals court to decide their motions "on their merits" and to direct the commissioner to comply with the injunction in the meantime. In the alternative, they asked the justices to consider the "merits" of the motions themselves and order the appeals court to grant them.
The Supreme Court opened its analysis by endorsing the kind of deal the parties had made. "The judiciary of our State should encourage this kind of standstill agreement," the court wrote. By voluntarily complying with the injunction, it said, "the government forestalled emergency satellite litigation over whether the appellate courts would require it to abide by the injunction's terms pending appeal."
That agreement, the court added, "prevents the extraordinary burden that emergency litigation places on courts, attorneys, and parties." The court of appeals' approach undercut that benefit, the justices said. The lower court denied relief "based solely on the existence of the standstill agreement," yet by denying the motions it "hastened the end of that agreement."
The justices also said the appeals court "effectively passed the buck to us." Had the Supreme Court denied the mandamus petition, they wrote, the commissioner would no longer have been bound by the superseded injunction under the agreement's terms. That would "most likely result in emergency motions for temporary relief from relators—the very kind of emergency motions that the standstill agreement was meant to avoid."
The court then stated its rule in both directions. "The existence of a standstill agreement like this one does not establish that appellants will not suffer irreparable harm if relief is not granted," the court wrote. "Nor, of course, does it mean that they will. Each case must be evaluated on its own merits."
The court did not decide whether the challengers are entitled to temporary relief. "We express no view of whether relators have shown entitlement to temporary relief under Rule 29.3," the opinion said, adding that "a decision on the merits of the underlying appeal may render the motions moot."
Susan Feigin Harris of Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP represented Cook Children's Health Plan, Texas Children's Health Plan and Superior HealthPlan. Stacy R. Obenhaus of Foley & Lardner LLP represented Wellpoint Insurance Company. Cory A. Scanlon of the Office of the Attorney General represented Stephanie Muth.
The case, No. 25-1030, now returns to the court of appeals, which must reconsider the Rule 29.3 motions. The court granted the petition conditionally, citing Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(c), and wrote that the writ "will issue only if the court of appeals does not comply."