Key Points
- The Supreme Court of Texas conditionally granted mandamus and directed a trial court to grant a motion for leave to designate Unlimited Contractor Property Services LLC as a responsible third party.
- Under Section 33.004(f) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, a trial court must grant a timely motion for leave unless another party objects within 15 days after service; Batley objected 281 days after the motion.
- The court held that the defendants' delay in setting the motion for a hearing did not matter, noting that Section 33.004 does not mention a hearing.
- The court rejected Batley's prejudice arguments, holding that any prejudice from failing to join Unlimited before limitations ran or from forgoing discovery was self-inflicted.
- The opinion left open a later motion to strike the designation on evidentiary grounds under Section 33.004(l).
The Supreme Court of Texas held Friday that a trial court had no discretion to refuse a request by the sellers of a San Antonio property to designate their foundation contractor as a responsible third party, because the buyer suing them did not object within the 15 days the state's Civil Practice and Remedies Code allows.
In a per curiam opinion issued without oral argument, the court conditionally granted a writ of mandamus to relators Edgardo Matos and Maria Rita Puentes. It directed the trial court to grant their motion for leave to designate Unlimited Contractor Property Services LLC. The buyer, Patricia Batley, filed her objection 281 days after the motion.
The ruling holds that the statute's deadlines run from when a motion is served, not from when it is set for a hearing, so a defendant's months-long wait to seek a ruling does not give a trial court grounds to deny a timely motion that drew no timely objection. "Section 33.004 does not mention a hearing at all," the court wrote. It also rejected Batley's argument that the delay caused her prejudice that justified striking the motion.
According to the opinion, Matos and Puentes, referred to collectively as Matos, sold an investment property in San Antonio to Batley in December 2020. Before the sale, and allegedly without Batley's knowledge, Matos had hired Unlimited to repair the foundation. After the foundation "began to substantially deteriorate," Batley sued Matos and others in January 2022, alleging fraud, negligence and violations of the Business and Commerce Code, including the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. Less than two months later, Matos brought Unlimited into the case as a third-party defendant on contract and warranty claims.
On July 17, 2024, Matos filed a second motion for leave to designate Unlimited as a responsible third party under Section 33.004. By then Batley had settled with every defendant except Matos, and trial was set for Sept. 16, 2024, 61 days away. At Batley's request, trial was later continued to July 2025.
Matos settled with Unlimited and dismissed it from the suit by October 2024. The next month, the statute of limitations ran on any direct claims Batley might have brought against the contractor. Matos did not notice a hearing on the designation motion until April 2025. One day before that hearing, Batley objected and moved to strike the motion, and the trial court denied and struck it in May. The San Antonio court of appeals denied mandamus relief without a substantive opinion on Feb. 11, 2026.
A defendant may move for leave on or before the 60th day before trial, and the trial court must grant leave "unless another party files an objection to the motion for leave on or before the 15th day after the date the motion is served," the court wrote, quoting Section 33.004(f). It cited its 2017 decision in In re Coppola, which noted that trial courts have no discretion to deny a timely motion absent a proper objection.
Because Matos moved 61 days before trial and Batley did not object within 15 days, the court held, the trial court "was therefore obligated to grant the motion for leave to designate, overrule Batley's untimely objection, and deny her motion to strike." The court also rejected Batley's reliance on subsection (g) of the statute, holding that it did not apply because her objection was untimely.
The delay in setting a hearing, the court wrote, "is of no consequence to the question facing the trial court." The opinion added that "it would be easy enough for the Legislature to tether the statute's timing requirements to the date a motion to designate is heard or granted rather than to when it is served." A court may not modify those requirements, it said, "even if as an abstract matter it may have been more prudent for Matos to have done so."
Batley had argued that the delay created irreversible prejudice. She said it kept her from joining Unlimited before limitations expired, and that Matos's dismissal of the contractor cut off her discovery. The court disagreed on both points. It noted that the July 2024 motion put Batley on notice of Unlimited and of Matos's position that the contractor caused all or part of her injury, leaving her more than four months before limitations ran in November 2024. "Any prejudice that Batley suffered by failing to join Unlimited was self-inflicted," the court wrote.
On discovery, the court said Unlimited had been a party "for well over two years" and that the timing of the motion and hearing did not impair Batley's ability to seek discovery from it. "If Batley was prejudiced by not engaging in discovery, that prejudice was again self-inflicted," the opinion said.
"We do not make light of Batley's quandary, and we recognize that Matos could have been more diligent in seeking a ruling on the motion," it wrote, but it held that the motion could not be denied on that basis. The opinion said its decision neither "forecloses (or embraces)" a later motion by Batley to strike Unlimited's designation on evidentiary grounds under Section 33.004(l), which allows a party to challenge a designation for lack of evidence of responsibility.
Barring the designation altogether was a clear abuse of discretion, the court held, and Matos had no adequate remedy by appeal. It quoted Coppola for the rule that "a relator need only establish a trial court's abuse of discretion to demonstrate entitlement to mandamus relief" when a trial court denies a timely Section 33.004(a) motion.
Geoffery Mayfield represented Matos and Puentes. Kenneth Grubbs represented Batley.
The writ was granted conditionally. The court directed the trial court to grant the motion for leave to designate Unlimited and wrote that it was "confident the court will comply, and the writ will issue only if it does not."