Key Points
- Under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 101.106(f), a suit against a government employee over conduct within the scope of employment must be dismissed on the employee's motion unless the plaintiff amends to dismiss the employee and name the government employer within 30 days.
- Espinoza named Texas Tech 53 days after its employee's motion and 93 days after the two-year limitations period expired.
- A Section 101.106(f) dismissal is without prejudice, but a refiled claim against the government remains subject to the statute of limitations, which is jurisdictional in suits against governmental defendants under Government Code Section 311.034.
- The court held that its 2011 Bailey decision protects plaintiffs who amend within the 30-day window after a late motion, and does not excuse a plaintiff who misses the window.
- The court reversed the Amarillo court of appeals and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court of Texas held on Nov. 20, 2026, that a woman who sued a Texas Tech University employee over a traffic collision cannot pursue her claim, because she did not name the university as the defendant within the 30 days the Texas Tort Claims Act allows after the employee moves to dismiss. By the time she named the school, the two-year statute of limitations had run, and in suits against the government an untimely filing strips courts of jurisdiction, the court held.
Justice Evan A. Young wrote the opinion of the court, which reversed a July 2025 decision of the Seventh District Court of Appeals in Amarillo and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The ruling restores the trial court's grant of Texas Tech's plea to the jurisdiction. The court of appeals had revived the suit brought by Sonia Janeth Espinoza.
The case turned on Section 101.106(f) of the Act, which treats a suit against a government employee over on-the-job conduct as a suit against the employee "in the employee's official capacity only" and requires dismissal on the employee's motion unless the plaintiff substitutes the government employer within 30 days. The court of appeals read the provision as "merely offer[ing] a mechanism to ensure the governmental entity is properly identified." Young wrote that the provision "does far more than the court of appeals held," and that missing the window brings dismissal and any consequences that follow from it, "such as a claim's being time-barred."
According to the opinion, Madyson Leita was driving a Texas Tech vehicle and acting within the scope of her employment when she rear-ended the vehicle Espinoza was driving on Dec. 3, 2021. Espinoza sued Leita alone on Nov. 17, 2023, less than three weeks before the two-year limitations period for personal-injury suits expired.
Leita moved to dismiss under Section 101.106(f) on Jan. 12, 2024, explaining that the claim arose from conduct within the general scope of her employment with Texas Tech. Espinoza filed an amended petition naming Texas Tech on March 5, 2024, which the court counted as 53 days after the motion and 93 days after limitations expired. The amended petition did not dismiss Leita, who left the case by the parties' agreement, memorialized in a March 13 court order. Texas Tech then filed its plea, and the trial court granted it.
"Given these facts, the trial court had no choice but to dismiss the suit," Young wrote. Espinoza's suit depends on the Act's waiver of sovereign immunity. That waiver, the court said, requires that "the procedures outlined in the statute [waiving immunity] [to] have been met," quoting its 2013 decision in Texas Adjutant General's Office v. Ngakoue.
Under Ngakoue, a dismissal for failure to substitute is without prejudice, so a plaintiff may sue the government again. But "that escape hatch was closed to Espinoza," Young wrote, because she was, in language the court drew from Ngakoue, "still subject to any other limitations with respect to suing the government, such as the statute of limitations." The court added that dismissed claims are treated "as though they had never been brought," citing its 2026 decision in Studio E. Architecture & Interiors, Inc. v. Lehmberg.
The opinion then tied that rule to jurisdiction. "Limitations is more than an affirmative defense in this context; untimely suits against governmental defendants are jurisdictionally barred," Young wrote, citing Section 311.034 of the Texas Government Code.
The court of appeals relied mainly on the Supreme Court's 2011 decision in University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio v. Bailey and did not mention Ngakoue, even though, Young wrote, Texas Tech's briefing "thoroughly addressed" that case. "Indeed, far from supporting the court of appeals' conclusion, Bailey undermines it," he wrote.
In Bailey, a government employee waited more than a year, until just after limitations expired, to file his Section 101.106(f) motion, and the plaintiffs amended their pleadings within 30 days. The court there rejected the university's limitations defense. Young explained that the substitution in Bailey "did not add a truly new defendant but just properly named one who had been there all along."
Had the Bailey plaintiffs missed the deadline, the court said, dismissal would have been required, and the timeliness of a new suit "would have been measured not by their original filing date but by the date on which the plaintiffs named the government as the defendant." Young described what Bailey does protect: "Bailey clarifies that defendants cannot game the system—that waiting until limitations has run to reveal that the government should be the named party will not deprive plaintiffs of the thirty-day safe harbor to amend their pleadings."
The court accepted the court of appeals' starting point that a suit like Espinoza's is, "in all but name, a suit against the governmental employer," a principle Young called "well established in Texas law." But he wrote that the premise "provides no authority for disregarding" the statute's direction about what a plaintiff must do to maintain such a suit.
Lawyers for Texas Tech included Evan S. Greene of the Office of the Attorney General. Espinoza was represented by Steven L. Eason of Fasoro Law Firm, PLLC.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the court of appeals should have affirmed the trial court.