Key Points
- The First Department modified the Surrogate's order to grant Kramer Levin's motion to dismiss in its entirety and affirmed dismissal of the claims against Dentons and Kidron.
- A law firm representing executors owed no fiduciary duty to beneficiaries adverse to its clients, and its fees and a partner's board seat were not self-dealing that would create such a duty.
- The aiding-and-abetting claim failed because the estate suffered no damage from the BIK acquisition, any injury belonged to Temco, and the petition did not adequately allege actual knowledge or substantial assistance.
- Leave to add a legal malpractice claim was properly denied because the petitioner had no attorney-client relationship with the respondent lawyers.
- Summary judgment against co-executor Rosenblum was properly denied because his alleged negligence as a co-fiduciary cannot be decided without a trial.
A New York appeals court on Nov. 17 dismissed every remaining claim against Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP in a New York County Surrogate's Court fight over the estate of Herman Hellman. The court held that the firm, which represented the estate's executors, owed no fiduciary duty to beneficiaries who were challenging those executors.
A unanimous five-justice panel of the Appellate Division, First Department, modified an April 15, 2025, order of New York County Surrogate Rita Mella. That order had dismissed only the fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and constructive trust claims against Kramer Levin; the panel granted the firm's motion to dismiss in its entirety. In the same unsigned decision, the panel affirmed the dismissal of claims against Dentons US LLP and Kidron Corporate Advisors LLC.
The ruling leaves petitioner Gregory P. Taxin with his breach of fiduciary duty claim against co-executor Scott S. Rosenblum, a Kramer Levin partner, which the panel said cannot be decided without a trial. It also applies in the estate setting the First Department's rule that routine legal work for a client is not substantial assistance in that client's alleged wrongdoing.
Many of the petitioner's claims rest on what the court called the BIK transaction. The estate owned 51% of the shares of Temco, which in turn owned BIK. The petition alleges that former co-executor Henrik Thomassian diverted BIK. Temco, including BIK, was sold to nonparty Atalian.
Kramer Levin represented Rosenblum and Thomassian on their accounting of the estate, to which two beneficiaries filed objections. The panel quoted a 1995 First Department decision: "[a]n attorney does not owe a duty of care to his adversary."
The petitioner had argued that Kramer Levin was self-interested because it collected fees from the estate and from nonparty Jobmatch USA, and because Rosenblum obtained a seat on Jobmatch's board. Those allegations, the panel wrote, "do not constitute the type of self-dealing that would impose a fiduciary duty on an attorney to beneficiaries who are adverse to its clients."
Kidron likewise owed no duty to the estate, the court held, because it had been retained solely to advise Temco. The fact that Kidron's founder, Segall, sat on Temco's board meant he owed a fiduciary duty to Temco, not to the estate. Payments the estate made to Kidron, the panel added, concerned work unrelated to the BIK transaction.
The panel also dismissed the claim that Kramer Levin aided and abetted Thomassian's alleged breach of fiduciary duty, a claim the Surrogate had allowed to proceed. The estate, the court held, suffered no damage from Thomassian's acquisition of BIK, because BIK was Temco's asset, not the estate's. The panel wrote that "after a thorough process, Temco — including BIK — was sold to nonparty Atalian for a price higher than anyone else had offered." It noted that nonparty Duff & Phelps had opined that the price was fair and that the estate received its share of the proceeds.
Whether Temco itself suffered damages was "speculative," the court wrote, and any such harm belonged to the company. A shareholder may sue only derivatively for a wrong done to the corporation. The panel quoted the Court of Appeals: "For a wrong against a corporation[,] a shareholder has no individual cause of action." It found that the case did not fit the "narrow exception" to that rule.
The aiding-and-abetting claim failed for two further reasons as to all three respondents. The petition did not allege actual knowledge of the breach in nonconclusory terms. The panel called "simply insufficient" the allegation that "it is impossible for Kramer Levin . . . to have been unaware of Thomassian's conflict and self-dealing." Nor did the petition sufficiently allege knowing participation. As to the law firms, the court wrote, "perform[ing] routine legal services on behalf of their client . . . does not amount to substantial assistance in the commission of the alleged breach."
The fraud claim against Kramer Levin and Kidron failed. Insofar as it rested on affirmative misrepresentation, Temco, not either respondent, made the allegedly misleading statements in its section 228(e) notice. Insofar as it rested on concealment, the absence of a fiduciary relationship with the estate defeated it. The panel refused to consider a theory that Kramer Levin aided and abetted Thomassian's fraud, because neither the original nor the proposed amended petition pleaded it; a petitioner "may not add a new theory of liability for the first time on appeal," the court wrote.
The special facts doctrine "applies to claims of fraud in sales transactions," the court wrote. The relevant sale ran from Atalian to nonparty NYX Investments BV, in which Thomassian later acquired an interest, not from either respondent to the estate.
With the tort claims gone, the court dismissed the conversion and turnover claims against Kramer Levin, reasoning that the firm had not exercised control over money "without authority." The constructive trust claim failed for want of a fiduciary duty and of any alleged promise concerning the fees.
The Surrogate's Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying leave to amend, the panel held. The proposed breach of fiduciary duty claim against Dentons alleged no self-dealing that would create a duty to the beneficiaries. The proposed legal malpractice claim failed because a petitioner cannot sue a lawyer for malpractice without an attorney-client relationship, and none of the special circumstances such as "fraud, collusion, [and] malicious acts" existed.
Lawyers for Taxin included Frank T. Santoro of Farrell Fritz, P.C. Kramer Levin was represented by Joshua S. Rubenstein of Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP. Dentons was represented by Yelena Rapoport of Elman Freiberg PLLC, Kidron by Adam T. Hoffman of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, and Rosenblum by Ross S. Katz of Schlesinger Lazetera & Auchincloss LLP.
The panel affirmed the denial of Taxin's motion for summary judgment on liability against Rosenblum. Quoting a 1970 Fourth Department decision, it wrote that "[T]he question of [the non-self-dealing co-trustee]'s negligence in failing to prevent a breach of trust or in improperly delegating its responsibilities cannot be determined without a trial."