Key Points
- The Second District Court of Appeal reversed a $642,646.94 final judgment awarding attorneys' fees and costs to Baker Barrios Architects Inc. under section 768.79, Florida Statutes, and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court held that section 768.79 ties fee entitlement to a judgment, not a jury verdict, and that a fee award entered before a final judgment on liability is premature.
- No judgment was ever entered on the jury's no-liability verdict, and the fee judgment's opening words, "Pursuant to the jury verdict," did not supply one because BBA never requested such a judgment and the words did not say what the jury found.
- Judge Smith wrote the opinion, and Judges Silberman and Kelly concurred; the court did not reach 949 Cleveland's other arguments.
A Florida appeals court has reversed a $642,646.94 award of attorneys' fees and costs to Baker Barrios Architects Inc., holding that the state's offer of judgment statute allows such an award only after a court enters judgment, and that no judgment was ever entered on the jury verdict that cleared the company of liability.
Judge Smith wrote for a unanimous three-judge panel of the Second District Court of Appeal, which reversed and remanded on Nov. 20. Judges Silberman and Kelly concurred. The decision returns the case to the Circuit Court for Pinellas County, where, the panel wrote, "there is clearly more work to be done by the trial court in this case."
The ruling turns on the difference between a jury's verdict and a court's judgment. Section 768.79, Florida Statutes, which the opinion calls "the offer of judgment statute," lets a defendant whose settlement offer goes unaccepted recover reasonable fees and costs "if the judgment is one of no liability" or if the plaintiff's judgment is at least 25 percent less than the offer. The panel held that "an award of attorneys' fees and costs, prior to the entry of a final judgment on the issue of liability, is premature and will be reversed."
The plaintiff, 949 Cleveland Street LLC, sued BBA, as the opinion refers to the company, alleging construction defects, negligence and violations of the Florida Building Code. Shortly after the suit was filed, BBA served 949 Cleveland with a proposal for settlement, which went unaccepted. The trial court ordered nonbinding arbitration, but 949 Cleveland opted to go forward with a jury trial, and the jury returned a verdict of no liability in BBA's favor.
BBA then moved for a final judgment taxing attorneys' fees and costs "by virtue of the jury's verdict." According to the opinion, the motion did not ask the trial court to confirm or enter judgment on the verdict. It argued instead that the verdict "serves as an adjudication on the merits." All parties agreed on the record that no judgment had been entered on the verdict.
Circuit Judge Patricia A. Muscarella found BBA entitled to fees under the statute and found some, but not all, of its requested fees reasonable. Her order awarded BBA $598,866.44 and said that amount "shall be included in a Final Judgment when such is entered in this case." The document later entered as the Final Judgment awarded BBA $533,378.44 in fees and $109,268.50 in costs, with interest at 8.65% a year, and opened with the words "Pursuant to the jury verdict rendered in this action."
On appeal, 949 Cleveland argued that the Final Judgment related strictly to fees and costs rather than serving as the final judgment in the case. BBA contended that it was the final judgment because it confirmed the jury's verdict. The panel said it had jurisdiction either way, citing Florida Supreme Court precedent that an order awarding fees that contains the phrase "for which let execution issue" is an independently appealable final judgment.
Quoting a 2005 Second District decision, Judge Smith wrote that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure "contain many references to a final judgment, but they do not appear to contain a rule explaining the procedure for entry of judgment on a jury's verdict." The panel found instructive a model defense-verdict judgment in the rules' forms, which adjudges that the plaintiff "take nothing by this action." Entering such a judgment is usually routine, the court said, but "it still remains the trial court's responsibility to enter a judgment on the jury's verdict."
The panel read the statute's "plain and clear language" to require "a judgment, not a verdict." It cited the Florida Supreme Court's 2016 decision in Anderson v. Hilton Hotels Corp., which said that "entitlement to attorneys' fees hinges on the 'judgment obtained,' as opposed to a verdict form returned by the jury." The court also cited the high court's 2008 decision in Frosti v. Creel, which held that a judgment obtained should not be equated with a jury's verdict.
BBA's argument, the court wrote, "rests on those first five words in the Final Judgment: 'Pursuant to the jury verdict.'" Judge Smith wrote that "these five words are legally insufficient to carry the day." BBA had not sought a judgment on the verdict in its motion and, according to the opinion, "declined to heed the suggestion from 949 Cleveland to first obtain such a judgment."
"Indeed, a trial court cannot be said to have entered certain relief where none was requested," the panel wrote, citing a 2002 Florida Supreme Court decision. The court noted that BBA had abandoned its "adjudication on the merits" argument on appeal. It added that the five words "fail to give any hint of what the jury's verdict was, leaving open the question of liability or what, if anything, the jury found and for whom."
In a footnote, the court said nothing in the statute bars a prevailing offeror from moving for fees after a verdict but before a "judgment obtained," though the statute sets an "outside deadline of thirty days after the filing of the judgment." Because it found the prematurity issue dispositive, the panel did not address 949 Cleveland's remaining arguments.
Howard W. Poznanski represented the appellant. Amy L. Koltnow of Kelley Kronenberg represented the appellee. The other appellees, B&W Structural Designs LLC, ZMG Construction Inc. and Prospect Construction & Development Group LLC, made no appearance.
The panel remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The opinion is subject to revision before official publication.